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Abstract
In modern societies, both business and private life are deeply pervaded by
software and information systems. Using software has extended human capa-
bilities, allowing information to cross physical and ethical barriers. To handle
misuse dangers, governments are increasingly laying down new laws and intro-
ducing obligations, rights and responsibilities concerned with the use of soft-
ware. As a consequence, laws are assuming a steering role in the specification
of software requirements, which must be compliant to avoid users be exposed to
fines and penalties.
This work proposes a model-based approach to the problem of law com-
pliance of software requirements. It aims at extending state-of-the-art goal-
oriented requirements engineering techniques with the capability to argue about
compliance, through the use and analysis of models. It is based on a language
for modelling legal prescriptions. Upon the language, compliance can be de-
fined as a condition that depends on a set of properties. Such a condition is
achieved through an iterative modelling process.
Specifically, we investigated the nature of legal prescription to capture their
conceptual language. From juridical literature, we took a taxonomy of legal
concepts, which has been elaborated and translated into a conceptual meta-
model. It is then bound with the meta-model of a goal-oriented modelling
language for requirements engineering, in order to provide a common legal-
intentional meta-model.
Requirements models built with the proposed language consist in graphs,
which ultimately can be verified automatically. Compliance amounts then in a
set of properties the graph must have.
The compliance condition gains relevance in two cases. Firstly, when a
requirements model has already been developed, and it needs to be reconciled
with a set of laws. Secondly, when requirements have to be modelled from
scratch, and they are wanted to be kept compliant. In both cases, compliance
results as the product of a modelling process.
The developed modelling language, as well as the compliance condition
and the relative process, have been applied to two case studies. The obtained
results confirm the validity of the approach, and point out interesting research
directions for the future.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The history of computer science is characterised by two important milestones.
The first one is the invention of modern computing machines - the computers.
The second one is the interconnection of computers into a worldwide network
- the Internet. If the first milestone is a clear dividing line for technology, the
second milestone gets a social revolution underway. In the Internet era, com-
puters communicate with each other to accomplish tasks that were otherwise
not possible. This transformed computing machines into complex entities such
as software systems, software-intensive systems, or socio-technical systems, up
to that innovative yet vaguely defined concept of Future Internet as a single,
global infrastructure comprised by several sub-system and components work-
ing together. Such systems support processes and business, governments and
companies, as well as professional, social and private life. Living in the Inter-
net era has become dependent on the communication capabilities of computers:
a report of the U.S. Department of Labor states that for the last five consecutive
years the most common disruption to business was the loss of broadband inter-
net connection, and concludes that long-term failure could be catastrophic1.
The real life and the digital life are nowadays interleaved. What happens in
the real life can be propagated through electronic highways to the world, and
1http://ezinearticles.com/?Internet-Reliability-Most-Common\
-Disruption-to-Business,-HDTV-Offers-New-Threat&id=1241165
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what happens in the digital world can turn out into real events. This fact raised
the attention of governments on the need to regulate by law citizens’ electronic
interaction. In recent years, new laws have been enacted to explicitly regulate
sensitive matters, such as business and health assistance, when performed on
networked systems. Also, previous laws have gained new meaning when re-
ferred to an Internet-based activity.
The social relevance of information systems impacts on the way the informa-
tion system has to be conceived. If misaligned with legal prescriptions, a func-
tionality of the system can violate the rights of users, and ultimately breaches
the law. Nevertheless, it’s trivial mentioning that the system itself is not respon-
sible for the breach, and someone else - the committer? the administrator? the
analyst? - will pay for it. Preventing this situation to happen is in the hand
of those who are called to define the system’s functionalities: the requirements
analysts.
1.1 Research problem
Goal-oriented requirements engineering (GORE) rests on the idea of deriving
the requirements for a software system from the analysis of the goals that the
system-to-be will support once developed and deployed. However, when the
stakeholders are addressed by laws, the system-to-be has to be aligned with the
legal prescriptions too, and goals, per se, don’t provide information about such
alignment. This is the problem of law compliance of goals models.
Finding a solution to this problem means finding the assignment of actors
responsibilities (goals) such that if every actor fulfils its goals, then law is re-
spected. This is the condition or law-compliance of requirements, and we derive
a general rule to say that a requirements set is compliant with a law:
R,K |= L (1.1)
which means that, given a set of requirements R, represented as actors goals,
2
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and a set of domain assumptions K, the requirements are compliant with a law
L if, for every possible state of the world, if R holds, then L holds.
To produce a usable solution to the problem of law compliance of require-
ments, we adopt a modelling approach, which consists in starting from a model
of legal prescriptions, and then building the model of goals in an incremental
way that maintain the alignment with the prescriptions. The specific problem
that we are trying to address here, is to provide a definition for the notion of
“alignment” in terms of the necessity or possibility for certain strategic element
to exist or not.
1.2 Contribution
The contribution of this thesis is summarised as a set of conceptual tools for
modelling legal prescriptions, a method to analyse the models for compliance,
and a methodology to guide analysts through the modelling and analysis phases.
Conceptual tools The first ingredient for proposing a solution to the above prob-
lem is the identification of the proper conceptual tools. Law is a discipline with
its own history, philosophy and language, and if we want to address it, we have
to draw from its world. A milestone of juridical literature is Hohfeld’s taxon-
omy of legal rights, which describes the building blocks of law. The taxonomy
is comprised by the 8 concepts of duty, claim, privilege, no-claim, power, lia-
bility, immunity and disability, structured in opposites and correlatives. Upon
that taxonomy is built the meta-model of the Nomos framework. Such a meta-
model provides the syntax for a modelling language that integrates legal con-
cepts with intentional elements. Specifically, we integrated the Hohfeldian tax-
onomy with the i* set of concepts. This results in a language for modelling
legal prescriptions alongside stakeholder requirements. The language also pro-
vides a visual notation for representing models, which extends the i* modelling
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language, adding the capability to specify the rights existing between actors of
the domain. Moreover, it is able to represent legal rights in the rationale of
stakeholders, and to link them with actor goals and plans.
Compliance analysis The conceptual tools represent a means to argue about
compliance or not compliance of a requirements model. In other words, they are
used to provide a definition of the requirements compliance problem of Equa-
tion (1). We move from the idea that legal prescriptions carry legal knowledge
representable with such concepts. Physically, legal texts are documents written
in natural language, but they can be broken down legal into their most atomic
elements, the normative propositions. A normative proposition is a proposition
that contain the nature of the right (duty, claim, etc.), the holder of the right,
its counter-party, and the action to which the right applies. The first step to de-
fine compliance becomes this way the definition of compliance with respect to
a single normative proposition. Afterwards, compliance to the law as a whole
is defined as the sum of compliance to their single propositions. In doing this,
a special attention is paid to the problem of complexity. Specifically, is shown
how a large number of alternatives may arise from the conditions and excep-
tions that law contains, as well as from the strategic alternatives that exist to
comply with law. The models will retain properties of (i) workability, being
the compliance choice feasible with respect to actor capabilities; (ii) auditabil-
ity, because the compliance solution will include requirements for auditing the
running system and monitor its compliance; and (iii) traceability of the audits
and processes back to their originating compliance choices, and up to the source
laws.
Process Finally, the use of language and the tools for compliance analysis has
been coded into a methodological process, which aims at incrementally build-
ing models of compliant requirements. It illustrates the steps to be done to build
4
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1.3. THESIS STRUCTURE
models of requirements that comply with law, or to reconcile with the law exist-
ing requirements. The process covers those aspects of law compliance that are
not related with the capabilities of goal-based models. A first aspect is the rec-
onciliation of law-level subjects with domain-level stakeholders; in other words,
if the law speaks in very generic terms (such as “the citizen” or “the covered en-
tity”), in the domain we have more specific actors, such as “the user” or “the
administrator”. Covering the discrepancies between the two worlds is done at a
methodological level. The identification of relevant laws and law fragments is
also done here, to avoid that the models to be built become too big and complex.
Strictly related to both the previous activities, is the exploration of legal texts to
discover applicable laws, which may lead to include new actors, and this way
bring to the identification of new requirements.
Additionally, we report the application of the proposed framework to three
case studies. The first case study, developed as a sandbox scenario for testing
the framework, concerns the generation of law-compliant requirements to the
U.S., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. The second case
study, developed within an industrial project, concerns the verification of law
compliance of partially defined requirements with respect to the Italian privacy
law. The third case study, developed within a European project, concerns the
gathering of requirements from implicit knowledge, exploiting laws as an addi-
tional source of information.
1.3 Thesis structure
The thesis is organised as in Figure 1.1. Chapter 2 survey recent work on re-
quirements engineering applied to the problem of law compliance. Chapters 3
presents a theoretical definition for the desired solution to the problem. Chap-
ter 4 introduces the requirements engineering modelling framework for arguing
about compliance of requirements models. Chapter 5 makes an analysis of the
5
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compliance condition and make explicit how to define it in terms of models.
Chapter 6 gives a set of guidelines and a structured process to use the mod-
elling and analysis framework in practice. Chapter 7 illustrates the application
of the framework to two case studies. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes our work
and discusses future research directions.
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Chapter 2
State of the art
An important part in the comprehension of the requirements compliance prob-
lems stays in the disambiguation with respect to others branches of information
technology. The present work has required a cross-disciplinary deepening of
both requirements engineering and legal literature. We will present in the fol-
lowing those research results that have been relevant for shaping our work. We
will touch in particular four research areas: formal logics for automatic legal
reasoning and artificial intelligence; knowledge representation of law-related
information; normative multi-agent systems; and very recent literature on the
specific theme of legal compliance in requirements engineering.
2.1 AI and Law
Law firstly came into the scene of computer science with the efforts made by
logicians to represent legal prescriptions in a formal shape. The idea, pointed
out by Allen (Allen, 1957) was that it is possible to formalise law as a logical
theory, in order to be able to make conclusions about the consequences of the
law.
Stamper proposed LEGOL (Stamper, 1980), a LEGally Oriented Language
aimed at expressing a legislation by means of formal rules, suitable to be pro-
cessed by computers. The idea behind LEGOL was that legislations shape the
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behaviour of information systems: regardless on how information systems are
implemented, they perform within the boundaries created by laws.
McCarty’s TAXMAN system (McCarty, 1980) is an (experimental) appli-
cation of artificial intelligence techniques to the study of legal reasoning and
legal argumentation, using corporate tax law as problem domain. It allows to
build models of facts comprising tax-related cases, such as corporations issue
securities, transfer property, distribute dividends, and so on. Law (specifically:
the United States Internal Revenue Code) is represented as rules, which classify
transactions as taxable or nontaxable, ordinary income or capital gains, divi-
dend distributions or stock redemptions, etc. Testing on several stock dividend
and corporate reorganization cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 1920’s
and 1930’s.
Following this experimental work, McCarty developed a Language for Legal
Discourse (LLD) (McCarty, 1989), based on deontic logic, to specify actions as
well as deontic operators. In LLD, one can specify the rule that any corporation
that owns cash has an obligation to distribute cash to all its stockholders in a
Lisp-like syntax.
A well known example of this approach is the work by Kowalski et al., who
try to represent the British Nationality Act as a logic program (Sergot et al.,
1986). That approach has been reported to be successful in the given context,
suggesting the feasibility for its application to a larger class of cases.
As will be mentioned at the very end of the present work, although automatic
reasoning hasn’t achieved the ambitious objectives it was hoped to have, it can
play a interesting role in the future of law-compliant requirements research. The
principles of legal reasoning and argumentation cover a significant gap in sup-
port modelling choices. And since modelling and modelling choices constitute
the core of the present work, we expect to be able to link the above mentioned
results with our compliance modelling theory.
Nevertheless, worth saying that the legal reasoning approaches developed in
10
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AI are hardly suitable for being directly used in requirements engineering, due
to various reasons. Firstly, such approaches are not targeted to provide a repre-
sentation of typical requirements engineering concepts, such as stakeholder, ob-
jective, preference and so on. Moreover, formal logic approaches are not usable
by non-experts, so that they result useless during the requirements engineering
phase, which generally involves a continuous interaction with stakeholders to
check that the work of the analysts has capture their needs and preferences. Fi-
nally, automatic reasoning has never been completely independent from human
intervention, because the need always exists, to provide an input to automatic
reasoners and interpret their output; so the problem still exists, how to support
analysts to perform every activity that can’t be left to the machine.
2.2 Knowledge Representation
Kelsen (Kelsen, 1991) proposed a general theory of norms, in which he classi-
fies norms in four categories: command norms, empower norms, permit norms
and derogate norms. Commanding norms command to to (obligation) or not to
do (prohibition) a certain action. Empowering norms associate roles with the
power to posit and apply norms under certain restrictions. Permitting norms re-
fer to what he called the positive sense of permission. Finally, derogating norms
alter the validity of another norm, which still exists, but it is no longer valid.
From a different standpoint, Hart classifies norms as primary and secondary (Hart,
1961). Primary norms refers to human behaviour, whereas secondary norms,
meta-level of the first, contain knowledge about primary norms. Secondary
norms may further be classified as rules of adjudication (to provide support for
solving conflicts), rules of recognition (to specify the limits of the legal system),
and rules of change (to specify how the legal system can change in time).
Valente’s FOLaw - Functional Ontology of Law - is an ontology of legal
system, which adopts a legal-sociological view rather than a law-only perspec-
11
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tive (Valente, 1995). The first purpose of FOLaw was to distinguish the various
types of knowledge in legal reasoning, and in particular those types that are typ-
ical for legal reasoning. Knowledge for legal reasoning is classified in six main
classes: normative knowledge, world knowledge, responsibility knowledge, re-
active knowledge, creative knowledge and meta-legal knowledge.
2.3 Multi-Agent Systems
A large literature exists on Norms and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), and we
use some of these works as a foundation for our framework. A normative multi-
agent system (NMAS) is defined as “a multi-agent system together with nor-
mative systems in which agents on the one hand can decide whether to follow
the explicitly represented norms, and on the other the normative systems specify
how and in which extent the agents can modify the norms” (Boella et al., 2007).
Moses and Tennenholtz (Moses and Tennenholtz, 1995) have defined the
concept artificial social system as a multi-agent system in which agents be-
haviour is constrained by a set of rules, called social laws or social norms. Such
norms are defined in terms of states of the system and abilities of the agents,
and allow agents to co-exists in the same system. Although norms are defined
at design-time, they are applied and monitored at run-time. However, their for-
malisation effectively captures the relation between agency and norms, and we
took inspiration fro their works.
An Electronic Institution (Esteva, 2003), or e-Institution, is a multi-agent
system designed as a variation of a finite state machine. Roles, which the agents
will be able to play, are explicitly modelled and articulated with respect to their
separation of duties. Agents play roles, and behave within “scenes”. Scenes
define the states, which the multi-agents system will exist in. A collection
of scenes is a “performative structure”. It defines the illocutions (messages)
that agents can exchange and the transitions from one scene to another. An
12
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e-Institution, as a whole, is the normative structure that articulates agents. E-
institutions are open systems, so agents with unpredictable behaviour can join
the institution and break the system. When a violation occurs, it results in a set
of (punishment) messages that the enforcing agents have to send, to restore the
institution into an acceptable state.
Our software engineering task of having a person check for compliance be-
tween a model of law and another of requirements is different from that of
formalising law for purposes of automatic question-answering and reasoning.
As in most other areas of Software Engineering, we assume that our models (of
law, requirements or whatever) only capture some of the formal properties of
the things being modelled, while the rest is left to humans (software engineers,
lawyers etc.) who are ultimately responsible for checking for compliance and/or
deriving designs. Our task is then to offer useful models of the artefacts of in-
terest (in our case, laws and requirements), along with systematic processes for
performing software engineering tasks, preferably with tool support.
2.4 Requirements
In recent years, the problem of law has begun to be considered in the earlier
phases of software engineering. The results, produced in attempting to for-
malise law for AI, have shown that law can’t be processed in a fully automated
way — human intervention is still needed to interpret and disambiguate legal
statements. Particularly, governments are recently laying down laws whose con-
tent hardly fits in automatised approaches. Laws, regulating the use of Informa-
tion Technology in fields such as privacy, health, finance, and other human-
related areas, easily miss the link with state-of-the-art technologies, and other
technical aspects related to their use and misuse. For this reason, recent IT-
related laws tend to state more abstract principles, instead of detailed procedu-
ral rules, leaving to the subjects responsibility to translate such principles into
13
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concrete behaviours. This way laws are capable to embrace a larger number
of behaviours. The gap introduced between legal prescriptions and concrete
behaviour is matter of study for requirements engineering.
A first, relevant problem to be solved when facing legal prescriptions is
the complex structure of legal documents. Anton and Breaux have developed
a systematic process, called semantic parameterisation (Breaux et al., 2008),
which consists of identifying in legal text restricted natural language statements
(RNLSs) and then expressing them as semantic models of rights and obliga-
tions (Breaux et al., 2006) (along with auxiliary concepts such as actors and
constraints).
Secure Tropos (Giorgini et al., 2004) is a framework for security-related
goal-oriented requirements modelling that, in order to ensure access control,
uses strategic dependencies refined with concepts such as trust, delegation and
permission, to fulfil a goal, execute a task or access a resource, as well as own-
ership of goals or other intentional elements. We use that framework to ensure
that compliance decisions, once made, are not compromised through the dele-
gation chains in an organisational setting. The main point of departure of our
work is that we use a richer ontology for modelling legal concepts, adopted
from the literature on law. Models based on the law ontology allow to reason
about where and how do compliance properties of requirements are generated.
Along similar lines, Darimont and Lemoine have used KAOS as a modelling
language for representing objectives extracted from regulation texts (Darimont
and Lemoine, 2006). Such an approach is based on the analogy between regu-
lation documents and requirements documents. KAOS goal models express the
goals of a law - i.e., why the law has been introduced by the legislator. From
such high-level goals, be decomposition, concrete law articles are modelled as
goals and attached to their reason-to-be. An object model defines the terminol-
ogy used by the law. An agent model defines the agents that are addressed by
the law. Finally, an operation model represents the behaviour of the addressed
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agents.
Ghanavati et al. (Ghanavati et al., 2007) use URN (User Requirements No-
tation) to model goals and actions prescribed by laws. URN combines two
complementary notations: the Goal-oriented Requirements Language (GRL)
and Use Case Maps (UCM). This work is founded on the premise that the same
modelling framework can be used for both regulations and requirements. GRL
is used to create a model of law. The model of law are models of goals, create by
extracting them from legal documents. At the same time, a goal model for the
organisation is created, which describes the needs and objectives of the hospital.
Finally, UCM diagrams describe the processes running inside the organisation.
The framework adds then traceability links between GRL elements and UCM
elements. Such links are used to keep track of which part of the business pro-
cesses are intended to guarantee the achievement of a certain goal. On the other
hand, the then-existing requirements tracking tool Telelogic DOORS was used
to link goals with the place, in law source, where they were extracted from.
Likewise, Rifaut and Dubois use i* to produce a goal model of the Basel
II regulation (Rifaut and Dubois, 2008). Basel II is the document published
in 2004 and produced by the second Basel Accord as a set of directives and
recommendations to be used as a standard by regulators of banking systems. It
indicates the allowances that banks (and therefore the whole financial system)
need to maintain to be reasonably protected against various types of financial
risks. In their approach, Rifaut and Dubois rely on the internal structure of
Basel II to map its content into goal models. This can be done because Basel II
gives a specific taxonomy of business process goals and assurance goals, which
are structured into assurance aspects. A business process is described in terms
of its purpose its outcome, which is evaluated through indicators. Purposes are
mapped into soft-goals, whereas outcomes and indicators are mapped into hard
goals, since they are unambiguously measurable. Multiple assurance aspects
are modelled this way.
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In summary, state-of-the-art approaches to law compliance for goal-oriented
requirements engineering mainly rely on seeing goal descriptions as “embed-
ded” into legal documents. We previously experimented this goal-only ap-
proach in the Normative i* framework (Siena et al., 2008a; Ghanavati et al.,
2010). That experience gave significant result in terms of gathering implicit
knowledge from stakeholders. However, it was not possible to sistematise the
goal modelling activity due to a lack in legal conceptualisation, which in turns
made necessary a relevant creativity effort for modelling.
Ensuring law compliance consists then in extracting such goals from legal
documents - either in a partially automated way or fully manually - and recon-
ciling them with stakeholders objectives. Goal-only approaches however don’t
consider (or it as implicit) that the transformation between something legal (le-
gal statements) and something strategic (goals) requires decision making. It in
turns requires (i) legal knowledge: knowledge and skills on law, law interpreta-
tion and implications; (ii) domain knowledge: knowledge on stakeholders needs
and expectations; and (iii) engineering knowledge: skills on how the require-
ments engineering process should be, and how to gather, validate and specify
stakeholder goals. The actor, in charge of merging these three aspects, is the
requirements engineer. The requirements engineer in its law-related decisions
does not have, in our knowledge, does not have a complete and systematic sup-
port in other existing frameworks.
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Law-Compliant Requirements
Requirements engineering basically falls back on linking the purpose of an in-
formation system with the problem it is supposed to solve (Nuseibeh and East-
erbrook, 2000). As of Jackson and Zave formulation, solving the requirements
engineering problem amounts in finding a solution (the specification) such that,
with the proper domain assumptions, if the specification holds, then the re-
quirements hold: S,K ` R (Zave and Jackson, 1997). Roughly speaking,
that formula says that the purpose of the information system, represented as
the specification S, is a solution for the problem represented as stakeholders
requirements R. If laws and regulations exist, which have effect on the infor-
mation system, then a part of the problem is to engineer a solution such that it
satisfies stakeholders goals and at the same time complies with such laws (Siena,
2007). This is the problem of law compliance of requirements. In this chapter,
we will provide a characterisation of the compliance problem, giving a defini-
tion of what are the properties of law relevant for requirements engineering, and
how we expect a solution should be conceived.
3.1 A Primer on Law
On the essence of law there is a millenary debate involving philosophy and
jurisprudence concerning what law actually is. It has the power to regulate and
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give reason to human actions in a way that presupposes characteristics universal
to every culture. Explaining how does it achieve this result involves both the
explanation of its normative means, as well as the psychological aspects that
make human being acknowledge such normative power. We will not enter such
philosophical problems, trying instead, for the purpose of the present work, to
adopt a more concrete notion of law. We can do this, because the universality
of normative power implies a conceptual independence from specific aspects of
legislations such as the language, the institutional structure of countries and so
on.
Law forms the legal infrastructure of countries, and shapes their politics,
economics and society in numerous ways. Law is primarily a human artefact,
resulting from human conception and action, and so working in practice with
law involves studying the physical artefacts that form law: legal sources.
There is a wide number of artefacts carrying normative power: governmen-
tal laws, regulations, rules, policies, norms, and so on; and each of them can
have an impact on information systems. Out of this heterogeneity, it’s of criti-
cal importance to understand the difference in the level of abstraction of legal
prescriptions. This difference originates two fundamental types of legal pre-
scriptions that ultimately distinguish the problem of law in requirements engi-
neering from the problem of law in later phases of software development. This
difference is effectively illustrated in (Logrippo, 2007), which speaks respec-
tively of Hammurabi laws and Moses laws. The first class of laws - inspired
by the biblical example of the Hammurabi code - states cause-effect rules, in
a shape similar to Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rules. This type of laws is
also called rule-level laws. The second class of laws - inspired by the biblical
example of the Moses code - states desired states of affairs, without specify-
ing how to reach them. This distinction is used to argue that Moses laws is
mostly the type of legal prescriptions that has to be taken into consideration at
requirements time (and for this reason they are also called requirements-level
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laws): this is because their level of abstraction makes necessary to evaluate the
requirements for their operationalisation into a concrete behaviour.
A less biblical characterisation distinguishes three level of legal prescrip-
tions (Biagioli and Grossi, 2008): Constitutive laws provide a propositional
definition of things being regulated. Procedural laws consist in collections of
propositions in natural language that describe the sequences of actions forming
a procedure. Regulative (or requirements-level) laws consist in collections of
propositions in natural language that define the states of affairs (desired by the
legislator). So we can represent a law as a set of propositions:
L = {l1, ..., ln} (3.1)
We’ll show in the next Chapter what’s the structure of such propositions.
Here we hypothesise that a regulative proposition of that kind simply contains
the description of how the world should be. If the world is actually in one state
described by the proposition, then we say that the proposition holds; otherwise,
the proposition does not hold.
Propositions and states of the world Generalising, we seek for formalism to ex-
press the fact that a set of propositions in a law L entail a set of states of the
world WL = W (L), so that WL is a model for L:
WL |= L (3.2)
We have then that a state of the world w is legal it is in the set of possible
worlds described by law L; i.e., if:
w ∈ WL (3.3)
For example, a privacy law L = {l1} may state that l1 = “electronic trans-
mission of health care data must be encrypted”. Once a system has been built
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and is running, according to its behaviour it can be in a finite set of states. Out
of them, law makes an assertion about the correlation between qualities of the
entities that form the system. Let suppose the entities are “Health care data”,
whose qualities can be “encrypted” and “not encrypted”, and “Transmission”,
whose qualities can be “in progress” and “closed”. The resulting states are
(w1) “Transmission” = “closed”, “Health care data” = “encrypted”;
(w2) “Transmission” = “in progress”, “Health care data” = “encrypted”;
(w3) “Transmission” = “closed”, “Health care data” = “not encrypted”;
(w4) “Transmission” = “in progress”, “Health care data” = “not encrypted”.
l1 states that (“Transmission” = “in progress”) → (“Health care data” = “en-
crypted”). In state w1 and w3 the pre-condition does not hold; in w4 the post-
condition does not hold; in w2 both pre- and post-conditions hold. This is a
pretty common approach in normative multi-agent field (see for example (Das-
tani et al., 2002)). We depart from such approaches in that we aim at repre-
senting the relation between the representation of a specific class of legal norms
(laws) and the representation of the states of the world defined by system re-
quirements. We model this relation by saying that {w2} |= L — i.e., by saying
that the statew2 is law-compliant with respect to the law L. The exact notion of
pre/post-condition, their semantics in requirements engineering and the way to
represent them in goal-oriented requirements engineering methodologies form
the solution to the problem of law compliance of requirements. In the next
section, we will try to characterise more such relation.
Law properties Before continuing, worth specifying two properties we assume
in our representation of law, to better circumscribe the problem. As said, law
is a collection of natural language sentences, which define a set of possible
states of the world. The structure and semantics of the sentences influences the
structure of the possible worlds. In particular, legal sentences may be (and they
actually are) affected by inconsistencies of any type, due to imperfections in
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their formulation. It may be the case that apparently both w and ¬w hold in
L. However, if this contradiction may exist in the source artefacts, in principle
this is not admissible in a legal system, and should be solved upstream of the
derivation of L. The assumption is then that contradictions don’t exist in L:
(w |= L)→ ¬(¬w |= L) (3.4)
Law always addresses subjects, who ultimately are the only responsible for
abiding the law. If the addressee can’t be identified, such responsibility can’t
be identified and nobody must abide the law. For instance, if a law says that
“killing is forbidden”, it means that those behaviours are forbidden, which cause
death. If killing is consequence of - for example - a natural disaster such a
typhoon, then nobody is responsible for that — we can’t say that the typhoon is
responsible of murder.
From this consideration, it follows the fact that the states of the world de-
scribed by law have to be matched with those that are local to subjects. Ev-
erything, that can’t be associated to a subject, can be ignored. We express it
by saying that, despite the words used in law sentences, the states of the words
described by law only concern behaviours. A consequence of locality of law
is that not every normative sentence is addressable to our purposes. For ex-
ample, if a state of the world described by a proposition contained in the law
can’t be reached with human actions, then the proposition is not considered for
compliance. Conversely, technical standards, which refer to properties of other
artefacts, are not contained into L, but the behaviour of the subjects in charge
adhering to the standard could be part of L . For example, if a propositions
apparently does not describe a behaviour - for example, a technical norm pre-
scribes that HTML documents must be enclosed within <html> and </html>
tags - then we say that the regulated actor could the the webmaster in charge of
developing a web site.
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3.2 Requirements Compliance
In the previous section, we have provided our notions of law and law-compliance.
Here, we will characterise the concept of law-compliance of requirements. Re-
quirements come from stakeholders needs and objectives, and are synthesised,
in goal-oriented approaches, as actors’ goals — i.e., states of affairs desired by
stakeholders. On the contrary, law describes states of affairs desired by the sub-
jects who create the law, but intended to be achieved by the subjects who are
addressed by the law. To do this, laws make prescriptions that have (a) different
language, (b) different concepts, (c) different interests, (d) different scope than
the stakeholders goals.
Laws can conflict with stakeholders goals and break their strategies. As a
consequence, stakeholders face law prescriptions by trying to adapt their strate-
gies and comply without compromising their objectives. The actual require-
ments come from this adaptation mechanism of objectives to laws.
The condition, in which a requirements set is not in contrast with the set of
applicable laws, is defined as requirements compliance. Defining what “not in
contrast” mean, implies being able to compare laws prescriptions and require-
ments. As said above, stakeholders’ needs and laws are not comparable in terms
of language, concepts, interests and scope. However, they have in common the
purpose of describing desired states of affairs. Along this line it is possible to
study the alignment of requirements with laws.
We hypothesize that both, law propositions and requirements statements, de-
scribe states of the world, but laws do it with underspecified information with
respect to stakeholders. Specifically, laws don’t provide information that are
local to the domain. Requirements describe the set of states of the world char-
acterised by the property of being wanted by stakeholders. Laws describe the
set of states of the world characterised by the property of being legal. The over-
all set of possible world is then given by the union of these two sets of states:
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W = WR ∪WL (3.5)
We derive a general rule to define the notion of compliance for requirements.
We say that, given a set of requirements R, and a set of domain assumptions K,
the requirements are compliant with a law L if, for every possible state of the
world, if R holds, then L holds.
R,K |= L (3.6)
A state of the world entails the requirements if it belongs to the states WR =
W (R). It is law compliant if it belongs to the states WL = W (L). We say that
a set of requirements R is compliant with respect to a set of laws L if and only
if, for every possible state of the world w that belongs to R, w also belongs to
L. In this case, we say that the entailment relation R,K |= L holds:
R,K |= L iff ∀w ∈ W, (w ∈ WR)→ (w ∈ WL) (3.7)
The property (w ∈ R) refers to the strategic value of a state, and it is fully
verifiable: since the information concerning R comes form the stakeholders,
strategic acceptability is part of the gathered knowledge. The property (w ∈
WL) refers to the legal acceptability of a state - i.e., to its compliance - and
verifying if it holds is the topic elaborated here.
3.3 Compliance Properties
In common sense, being compliant with law means behaving how law pre-
scribes. Without formally characterising it, we call this intuitive meaning of
compliance actual compliance because it means being actually compliant from
a theoretically correct point of view, and it’s therefore is the only meaning that
ultimately is relevant. This meaning has the drawback that it can only be re-
alised and verified ad run-time. For this reason, we have introduced the notion
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of intentional compliance, defined as the design-time distribution of respon-
sibilities such that, if every actor fulfils its goals, then actual compliance is
ensured (Siena et al., 2008b). In a perfect world - in an economic sense, a world
in which complete information and perfect rationality exist - intentional compli-
ance could be a sufficient answer to the problem of compliance, since it would
be possible (for everybody) to fully evaluate at run-time the compliance of the
running processes, the behaviour of the system and that of people. But in our
imperfect world, being actually compliant is not enough. Said with an example,
if a murder occurs, if somebody can’t prove his own innocence, then he can be
declared guilty, even if he is actually not guilty; similarly, if somebody is guilty
but can somehow prove his own innocence, then he can be declared innocent.
In other words, it becomes necessary to prove that the due has be done. Finally,
proving that a compliant process has been executed falls back in proving two
different things: first, that the process has been executed in a certain way; and
second, that the way it has been executed was the compliant one.
Ultimately, we derive a set of properties that a framework must be able to
express, in order to be a valid framework for law-compliance of requirements:
intentionality, ability, auditability, traceability.
Intentionality A compliance framework must be able to engineer a require-
ments set such that the system, once designed, developed and deployed cor-
rectly, will behave within the states admitted by legal sentences. As described
in previous section, Specifically, we want to link to legal prescriptions the pur-
poses for the system-to-be, rather than just its operations. This will allow that,
one the purpose if aligned with legal prescriptions, the specification will be
compliant by incremental construction.
Ability A key element that distinguishes laws from goals (as will be detailed in
the next chapter), is that laws are prescribed to classes of subjects, while goals
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are specific to a certain actor. In other words, laws disregard what actors can
or want to do. However, an important element that has to be taken into con-
sideration while gathering, validating and specifying requirements are actors’
attitudes. For example, in (Yu, 1996) are described the concepts of ability and
workability. In general, any compliance solution is acceptable only of the actor,
who has to be compliant, has the capability to perform the necessary actions -
either directly, or by delegating them - to achieve the desired objectives.
Auditability Only the running system is actually compliant or not compliant.
And true compliance can only be established ex post by the judge. Formal proof
of run-time compliance can’t be given at requirements time: there are properties
of law that makes that the compliance condition can only be stated ex-post by
the judge - e.g., the subsequent design could be wrong, people could behave
differently from what is assigned to them according to their roles, software pro-
grams could be bugged and also behave differently from what expected, as well
as the intentional ambiguity. Auditability refers to the capability to provide for-
mal evidence (proof) that a certain behaviour has been operated in alignment
with a normative proposition. The concept of auditability is not intrinsic to the
nature of law, although some laws may prescribe to keep some records from
the running processes. Rather, it is mostly an industrial need (Cederquist et al.,
2007). We add auditability as one of the requisites for a requirements com-
pliance framework, because we look at the problem of compliance from the
standpoint of stakeholders strategy.
Traceability Compliance choices have relevance in two different moments. The
first moment is when the choices are actually made, in order to align require-
ments with law. The second moment is subsequent to the requirements elicita-
tion, and it is when the motivation of the requirements is needed. For example,
when the requirements are going to change it is necessary to know where did
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the requirements come from, if they exist because of a strategic choice or due to
a legal necessity. Also, when law changes, it raises the need for knowing which
requirements are affected. This traceability information is also the first element
of provability of compliance choices.
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The No`mos Framework
The requirements analysis activity has the purpose of fostering a correct com-
prehension of stakeholders’ needs, and to ensure that requirements, once spec-
ified, retain some desired properties. Goal-oriented requirements (Mylopoulos
et al., 1999) engineering rests on the idea of deriving the requirements of a
software system from the analysis of the goals that the system-to-be will need
to achieve once developed and deployed (van Lamsweerde, 2001; Jureta et al.,
2008). Several works, exploiting currently established goal-oriented modelling
and analysis methods, provide evidence of the effectiveness of goal-oriented
requirements engineering (van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000; Fuxman et al.,
2004).
However, no evidence is given that the compliance relation between require-
ments and laws, as specified in Equation (3.6), holds. For this reason, we pro-
pose the No`mos1 framework, which aims at giving a conceptual and method-
ological solution to the requirements compliance problem. The framework is
comprised basically by 3 elements: a language for modelling requirements and
the impact of legal prescriptions on requirements; an analysis guidelines, to
check compliance as in Equation (3.6); and a process for systematically gen-
erating law-compliant requirements. This chapter covers the first element; the
next chapters will discuss the analysis and the process.
1From greek N o´µoς , which means “norm”.
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Table 4.1: The Hohfeldian taxonomy of legal rights.
Legal relation Opposite Correlative
Claim Noclaim Duty
Privilege Duty Noclaim
Power Disability Liability
Immunity Liability Disability
4.1 The Language of Law
In a general sense, addressing the issue of law-compliance of software require-
ments means being able to understand the actual prescriptions of legal state-
ments, and how they are reflected on stakeholders goals. To do this we firstly
want to understand the language and the concepts that form legal prescriptions,
in order to be able to build models of the prescriptions.
Normative propositions The normative semantics expressed by laws is carried
by utterances called normative propositions (Alchourron and Bulygin, 1971).
As in (Sartor, 2009), we will not make explicit distinction between the norma-
tive proposition, which is a meta-level assertion concerning what can or cannot
be deduced from a given set of law fragments, and the law fragment itself as a
norm. In other words, we consider every normative proposition as a proposition
carrying the normative power it pretends to have, and don’t investigate if and
why it actually has such power or not. Additionally, this notion of normative
proposition detaches the problem of normativity, per se, from the problem of
normative texts. The written source of law are ideally structured in a hierar-
chical way, comprised by chapters, titles, paragraphs, and so on; however, they
also make heavy use of cross-referencing, and stratification - i.e., succession
of additions, deletions, modifications - occurs over time. Tool-suppoted ap-
proaches (Kiyavitskaya et al., 2008; Breaux et al., 2008) are being developed to
cope with this problem. We move from where these methods end — i.e., from a
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flattened view on legal documents, in which cross-referencing and stratification
has been solved, so that we can see law as a set of well-formed sentences.
Normative propositions are sentences that charge somebody of a certain le-
gal modality with respect to an object: <NP> = <subject>, <object>,
<LM>. The physical or artificial person, who is addressed by the normative
proposition is referred to as the subject. The object of the proposition con-
cerns, directly or indirectly, a behaviour of the subject. The legal modality is
what actually carries the normative aspect concerning the object; i.e., it is what
actually creates a command or a prohibition.
Legal modality Several approaches have been proposed in the past to capture
the legal language. Deontic logic is the most known formalism, used over the
decades pursue objectives of automated legal reasoning, AI, multi-agent system
organisation and regulation and so on.
For our purposes, we have adopted as a background the Hohfeld’s fundamen-
tal legal taxonomy (Hohfeld, 1913). The Hohfeldian taxonomy is a milestone
of juridical literature that proposes a widely accepted classification of legal con-
cepts. The choice to adopt the Hohfeldian taxonomy of rights is due to several
factors. First, as said above, the importance it has in the juridical literature sug-
gests that this - not others - is actually the kind of information that we need
to know about law. Second, it’s range of concepts, and their level of abstrac-
tion, make their representation capabilities very close to the expressiveness of
legal texts. This consideration comes mainly from experience: constructs like
powers, immunities and so on do actually exist in legal texts, and the proposed
taxonomy is able to successfully capture them, differently for example from
deontic logic-based approaches. Finally, the Hohfeldian concepts that have a
descriptive nature, rather than prescriptive, acting as the bridge between the
world of the “ought”, typical of legal prescriptions, and the world of domain
description. Said differently, the Hohfeldian concepts do not prescribe what
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stakeholders should do - rather, they describe what are the legal relations that
bind them. This is of particular importance in requirements engineering, whose
first step (early requirements analysis) is to describe the so-called “as-is”, be-
fore specifying the “to-be”. So, linking a description of stakeholders goals with
a description of applicable laws may allow to reason about compliance and
compliant alternatives. In the following, we try to formally characterise such a
link.
Hohfeld’s taxonomy is grounded on the concept of right, which can be de-
fined as “entitlement (not) to perform certain actions or be in certain states, or
entitlement that others (not) perform certain actions or be in certain states”2.
Rights are classified by Hohfeld in the 8 elementary concepts depicted in Ta-
ble 4.1: privilege, claim, power, immunity, no-claim, duty, liability, disability,
and organised in opposites and correlatives, as in Figure 4.1. Two rights are
correlatives (Hohfeld, 1913) if the right of a person A implies that there exists
another person B (A’s counter-party), who has the correlative right. Vice versa,
the concept of opposition means that the existence of a right excludes its oppo-
site for the same action. The concept of correlativeness is particularly important
because it implies that rights have a relational nature. In fact, they involve two
subjects: the owner of the right and the one, against whom the right is held - the
counterparty.
The Hohfeldian taxonomy As said, Hohfeld’s taxonomy is based on the concept
of right. In commonsense it might be counterintuitively to call right a duty or a
liability, since the word has a different meaning, that is “having the entitlement
to legally pretend”. However, he points out that:
Latin “Ius”, the German “Recht”, the Italian “Diritto”, and the
French “Droit” [are] terms used to express not only a right, but also
Law in the abstract. (Hohfeld, 1913)
2From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/
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So the word “right” has two meanings: one weaker, which refers to the whole
class of legal entities; and one stronger, which refers to a particular type of right,
he calls Claim to disambiguate.
Claim and Duty Claim is the entitlement for a person to have something done
from another person, who has therefore a Duty of doing it; for example, if John
has the claim to exclusively use of his land, others have a corresponding duty of
non-interference.
[...] if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land,
the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to
stay off the place. (Hohfeld, 1913)
Privilege and No-claim Privilege (or liberty) is the entitlement for a person to
discretionally perform an action, regardless of the will of others who may not
claim him to perform that action, and have therefore a No-claim; for example,
giving a tip at the restaurant is a liberty, and the waiter can’t claim it.
“If the power of the State will protect him in so carrying out his
wishes, and will compel such acts or forbearances on the part of other
people as may be necessary in order that his wishes may be so car-
ried out, then he has a legal right so to carry out his wishes.” The
first part of this passage suggests privileges, the middle part rights
(or claims), and the last part privileges. (Hohfeld, 1913)
Power and Liability Power is the (legal) capability to produce changes in the
legal system towards another subject, who has the corresponding Liability; ex-
amples of legal powers include the power to contract and the power to marry.
X, the owner of ordinary personal property in a tangible object has
the power to extinguish his own legal interest (rights, powers, immu-
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opposite
correlative
correlative
opposite opposite
Privilege
Duty
No-claim
Claim Disability
Power Liability
Immunity
opposite
correlative
correlative
Figure 4.1: The fundamental hohfeldian legal rights.
nities, etc.) through that totality of operative facts known as abandon-
ment; and-simultaneously and correlatively-to create in other per-
sons privileges and powers relating to the abandoned object,-e. g.,
the power to acquire title to the later by appropriating it. (Hohfeld,
1913)
Immunity and Disability Immunity is the right of being kept untouched from
other performing an action, who has therefore a Disability; for example, one
may be immune from prosecution as a result of signing a contract.
If, indeed, a sheriff has been duly empowered by a writ of execu-
tion to sell X’s interest, that is a very different matter: correlative to
such sheriff’s power would be the liability of X,-the very opposite of
immunity (or exemption). It is elementary, too, that as against the
sheriff, X might be immune or exempt in relation to certain parcels
of property, and be liable as to others. Similarly, if an agent has
been duly appointed by X to sell a given piece of property, then, as to
the latter, X has, in relation to such agent, a liability rather than an
immunity. (Hohfeld, 1913)
The above taxonomy of rights offers concepts that have a descriptive na-
ture, rather than prescriptive. As such, the taxonomy acts as the bridge between
the world of the “ought”, typical of legal prescriptions, and the world domain
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description. In the following, we try to formally characterise such a link, and
explain how this allows for reasoning about compliance and compliant alterna-
tives.
Subject The subject in a normative proposition (or of a set of them) consists in
the description, in natural language, of the characteristics of the actors - a phys-
ical or artificial person - who is in charge of the need to comply with the nor-
mative proposition. The subject described by a normative proposition does not
explicitly identify the physical or artificial person; using the agent metaphor, the
law does not explicitly identify neither an agent nor a role. Law has no knowl-
edge of the agents or roles that exist in a certain domain at a certain time, so it
makes an abstraction and just gives the information that allows for identifying
the actual agent in every specific context.
Action The object of normative propositions concern, directly or indirectly,
actions performed by subjects (Roversi, 2005). Actions are composed by two
parts: the behaviour of the actor and the consequences of the behaviour. Ac-
tions specified by normative propositions can therefore be either behavioural
actions or productive actions.
A behavioural action consists in the specification of the behaviour to be per-
formed by the actor, regardless of the results it produces.
A productive action consists in the specification of the result of a behaviour,
regardless of the actual behaviour for producing the result.
The distinction between the two types is fuzzy, since the concept of causation
may lead to important issues. For example:
A person died of thirst in the desert, after that (a) one killer put poison
in the victim’s bottle to poison him, and (b) another killer indepen-
dently made a hole in the bottle to let the victim die of thirst. In such
a case, we may wonder who brought it about that the victim died:
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the first killer, who was prevented from poisoning the victim, or the
second, who saved the victim from being poisoned, and so postponed
the victim’s death. (Roversi, 2005)
And, from another standpoint:
We may wonder whether any type of causation by an agent’s bodily
movement (for example, a movement done while sleeping [...]) can
properly be said to realise an action. (Roversi, 2005)
Despite this terminological ambiguity, when referring to the action specified
by a normative proposition we will always mean a productive action.
4.2 Formalisation
In this section we outline a formal characterisation of the basic legal concepts
introduced above, borrowing definitions proposed by Sartor in (Sartor, 2006).
The purpose is to describe the essence of the adopted concepts in terms of their
deontic meaning, i.e. binding their meaning to the notion of “ought” that laws
contain.
The object of a right is an “action” (Sartor, 2006), i.e., an abstract charac-
terisation of a behaviour. Two types of actions exist: behavioural actions are
described by the actual behaviour performed by actors as “j does A”; productive
actions are described by means of the results produced by the behaviour of the
actors: “A brings it about that x” (Sartor, 2006). Notice that actions can be pos-
itive (do something) or negative (omit something), but we will always represent
them as positive; for example, both “don’t smoke” and “pay taxes” are consid-
ered actions to be performed by actors, regardless to the fact that the first one is
expressed with a negative proposition.
So, both types of actions are represented using the notation
DoesjA
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which means that the action A is ascribed to actor j. For example:
DoesJohn[Smoke]
John is smoking
DoesJohn[Get a degree]
John brings it about that he gets a degree
In deontic logic (von Wright, 1951), whenever an actor j is obligated to do
something (A), then j has an Obligation to do A, and it is written asOblj(A). If
j is forbidden to do something, he has a Prohibition, which is represented by the
predicate Forbj(A), and can be written in terms of obligation as Forbj(A) =
Oblj(¬A). When j is permitted to do something, then he has a Permission
(predicate Permj(A)) and can be also expressed in terms of obligation as Permj
(A) = ¬Oblj(A). The semantics of hohfeldian rights can be expressed in terms
of the above basic notions as follows.
Privilege - Noclaim. As first, we characterise the notion of privilege, which
intuitively means that the rightholder (actor j) is free whether to do or not to
do something (action A), with respect to any other (actor k). We can formally
write it as: PrivilegekDoesjA, where DoesjA is a description of the behaviour
of actor j. Notice that DoesjA implies that actor j has the ability to perform
A. This notion of privilege is equivalent to say that the actor j is permitted
by any actor k to not do action A, that is we can find an equivalent formalisa-
tion of the notion of privilege in terms of the deontic operators introduced by
Sartor (Sartor, 2006), as follows:
PrivilegekDoesjA ≡ Permk(NON DoesjA) (4.1)
Consistently, a no-claim is the missing prerogative of somebody (actor k)
to have something done by another (actor j) and can be written using deontic
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operators through the following equivalence:
NoClaimkDoesjA ≡ Permk(NON DoesjA) (4.2)
which reads as: the fact that actor k can not claim that actor j performs actionA
is equivalent to say that actor k permits actor j to not do action A. So it is pos-
sible to characterise the hohfeldian correlativeness relation along the following
equivalence:
PrivilegekDoesjA ≡ NoClaimkDoesjA (4.3)
The above formula is a normative proposition (NP ), and we represent it by
means of the predicate:
NP = privilegeNoclaim( j, k, A ) (4.4)
For example, if j is “hospital”, k is “patient”, and A is characterised as “Dis-
close PHI”, then the above formula means that the hospital is free (or not) to
disclose to the patient its PHI.
Claim - Duty. Similarly to the equivalence between privilege and noclaim,
it is possible to formalise the other correlative rights. So, the fact that an actor
(j) has a duty towards another actor (k) to perform an action (A) is expressed,
according to (Sartor, 2006), by the formula:
Claimk(DoesjA) ≡ Oblk(DoesjA) (4.5)
where the Claim side is a formal representation of Claim, and the Obl side is
the formal representation of Duty. This is equivalent to say that actor k has the
obligative right towards j, to have action A done.
We represent this equivalence with the predicate:
NP = claimDuty( k, j, A ) (4.6)
Power - Liability. Generally speaking, power is the right to produce legal
effects, which means changing the normative position of somebody else. The
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normative position P of an actor k, written (P k), is the set of legal entitlements
of k. For example, voting, the entitlement to marry or to own a driving license,
the enrolment as university professor, but also a governmental license to trade
cigarettes or to manage a casino - all of these are examples of legal position of
a given actor. Normative positions have a legal existence, and as such they
can be created or deleted by means of legal actions. For our purposes, we
consider a particular notion of power - the enabling power - which is used to
complement legal claims by acting as the means for the claim’s accomplishment
to be ensured. Powers are conferred to an actor to further its interests. IfA is the
action that has legal effect, and B is the interest to be protected, then we write
B VIA A to mean that, doing A has the purpose of achieving B. The enabling
power results:
EnablingPowerjP
k(B VIA A) ≡ (IF DoesjA THEN B) (4.7)
If B is something that the actor is legally entitled to pretend (a claim), then a
law can define a legal action that the actor can undertake to enforceB, if it is not
fulfilled. We call that action a sanction, S. This complements a claim/duty in
that it allows to activate the sanctioning mechanism in the caseB is not fulfilled.
We have then:
EnablingPowerjP
k(S) ≡ LiabilityRightk(DoesjS) (4.8)
that means that, whenever an actor has a claim, then it should also have the
power to pretend the accomplishment of the claim in case the obligated actor
does not fulfill its duty. Notice that this is a strong assumption and in laws it’s
possible to find claims without connected power; we admit this possibility, but
it will not be explained here, as it is a simpler case. Similarly, liabilities can
further be connected to other rights, but for sake of simplicity it will not be
explained here.
We represent the above formula by means of the predicate:
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NP = powerLiability(j, k, S )
Immunity - Disability. Finally, an immunity is a defence against the power
of others and consists in the right of being kept unchanged from other’s power,
by means of doing something. We represent this equivalence with the predicate:
NP = immunityDisability( k, j, S )
As depicted in Figure 4.2(a), the described formalism allows to map the first
Hohfeldian square of reights into deontic primitives. Similarly, due to Equa-
tion (4.7), the second Hohfeldian square can be mapped too, as depicted in
Figure 4.2(b). In the following, we will rely on this semantics when defining
the primitives of the No`mos language.
Giovanni Sartor
Right correlative Duty
opposite opposite
Noright correlative Privilege
Figure 1: The Hohfeldian obligative square
OblRightkDoes jA equivalent OblkDoes jA
incompatible incompatible
NoRightkDoes jA equivalent PrivilegekDoes jA
Figure 2: The Hohfeldian obligative square formalised
8 Permissive Rights and Liberties
The idea of a directed permission offers a basis for providing a notion of a permissive right,
which is a directed permission aimed at satisfying an interest of the person being permitted.
Definition 8.1 Permissive right. A person j has, toward a person k, the permissive right to do A
(PermRightkDoes jA) iff it is permitted toward k, in the interest of j, that j does A:
PermRightkDoes jA ≡ (PermkDoes jA)⇑j
Note that our notion of a permissive right is not reducible to the idea of an obligation, and neither
to the idea of a directed obligation: though the negation of a directed obligation occurs within the
permissive right, a further element is necessary to characterise the latter notion: the finalisation
of such a normative position to the advancement of the interest of the right holder. Consider,
for instance, the situation of a person j who has legally purchased a CD containing a computer
program. According to art. 5 of Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 (on the legal protection
of computer programs), j has indeed a permissive right to use (run) the program MySoft:
PermRightjDoes j [use MySoft]
However, it is not the case that this permissive right also covers the use of the program by other
people. In other words, whenever k #= j:
NON PermRightjDoesk [use MySoft]
When, for the benefit of a person, this person is both permitted to perform and to omit an action—
that is, when the action is facultative—we can say that he or she has a liberty right with regard
10
(a)
Fundamental Legal Concepts
EnablingPowerjPosk equivalent SubjectionjkPos
incompatible incompatible
DisabilitykjPos equivalent Immunity
j
kPos
Figure 4: Formalisation of the Hohfeldian potestative square
to a certain action in order to deter or punish its performance: we would not say that we have the
power to acquire the obligation to compensate a damage, by causing it through our own tortious
action.
To appropriately circumscribe the notion of a power—so that it matches our linguistic intuitions—
we need to refer to a teleological view of the corresponding normative connection: a normative
connection between one’s action and a normative result can be said to create one’s legal power to
achieve that result only when such a connection has the purpose of enabling one to achieve that
result by performing the indicated action (if one so decides). In this case we speak of an enabling
power.
Definition 16.1 Enabling Power. We say that j has the enabling-power to achieve B by doing
A, and we write EnablingPowerj(B VIA A) to mean that j’s performance of A normatively
determines B, in order to enable j to achieve B through A:24
EnablingPowerj(B VIA A) ≡ (IF Does jA THENnB)⇑[j can achieve B through A]
17 Potestative Rights
Through a further specification of the idea of an enabling power we get to the idea of a potestative
right, which is an enabling power that is intended to further the interest of the power holder (it
does not include those cases in which one’s power is aimed at satisfying a public interest or the
interest of other persons, like children or tutees).
Definition 17.1 Potestative right. We say that agent j has the potestative right to achieve B by
doing A, and we write PotestativeRightj (B VIA A) to express that j has the enabling power to
achieve B by doing A, in order to further j’s own interests:25
PotestativeRightj (B VIA A) ≡ (EnablingPowerjB VIA A)⇑j
In such a case, therefore, the normative connection IF Does jA THENnB is intended to enable
j to achieve B (EnablingPowerjB VIA A), but this enablement, in its turn, has the function
of enabling j to pursue his or her own interests. Let us assume, for instance, that our Roman
rule on wild animals is based upon the following teleological assumption: a hunter is enabled to
become the owner of the game in order favour his or her interests. If this is the law’s attitude,
24We use the upward arrow to express the purpose of the preceding normative proposition.
25As before, the upward arrow to expresses the purpose of the preceding normative entitlement, but we abbreviate
as j the proposition #j better pursues j’s own interests$. Note that by interest we mean whatever (legitimate) goals
j may choose to pursue, not only j’s egoistic goals.
21
(b)
Figure 4.2: The deontic representation of the Hohfeldian squares.
4.3 The No`mos modelling language
The purpose of No`m s is to link requirement models with law models, allowing
to argue ab ut c mpliance of the first with th latter. To do this, a language is
required, to model requirements and legal prescriptions.
To model requirements, No`mos adopts the i* modelling framework (Yu,
1996). Worth mentioning that this choice is not the only possible. Other frame-
works could be used or adapted to be used as well, as long as they provide
primitives for modelling actor , goals, and relationships between actors. The
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i* framework (Yu, 1996) models a domain along the two following perspec-
tives: the strategic rationale of the actors - i.e., a description of the intentional
behaviour of domain stakeholders in terms of their goals, tasks, preferences
and quality aspects (represented as softgoals); and the strategic dependencies
among actors - i.e., the system-wide strategic model based on the relationship
between the depender, which is the actor, in a given organisational setting, who
“wants” something and the dependee, that is the actor who has the ability to
do something that contributes to the achievement of the depender’s original
goals. The system-to-be is modelled as a new actor of the organisational set-
ting that enables the achievement of domain stakeholders goals, so expressing
the requirements of the system. For a detailed description of the i* framework,
see (Yu, 1996). Here, we recall the important concept of actors ability to pur-
sue a goal. An actor has the ability to achieve a goal G if (i) the actor has in
the set of intentional elements that characterise it (such as sub-goals, tasks and
resources) an element or a set of elements whose purpose is the achievement of
G; or, (ii) if the actor can delegate the achievement of the goal to another actor
- the dependee.
Upon the i* language, No`mos introduces a notation to model normative
proposition. The combination of i* and the extension for law modelling consti-
tutes the No`mos modelling language.
4.3.1 Meta-model
The No`mos modelling language relies on a meta-model (Siena et al., 2009c),
which has the twofold objective of providing an abstract characterisation for the
language, and integrating its modelling capabilities with those of the i* meta-
model, as proposed for example in the variant used by the Tropos methodol-
ogy (Susi et al., 2005). The No`mos meta-model is depicted in the diagram of
Figure 4.5. The dashed line represents a part of the i* meta-model, limitedly
to the Actor class and its wants association with goals. The dotted line is
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a UML representation of the predicate described in previous section as a nor-
mative proposition - i.e., the descriptions of the right between two subjects,
and the action that the right refers to. A normative proposition (NP) It is the
lowest level of granularity in which it’s possible to split a law statement. How-
ever, the structure of normative propositions not necessarily matches the textual
description of legal sentences, as discussed above.
Right Since rights have a dual nature, the relation of “correlative” or “equiva-
lent” means that the two rights that it connects - for example, duty and claim -
are interchangeable, because they describe the same reality from two different
points of view. So for example, instead of speaking about “duty” and its correl-
ative “claim”, we speak about a unique class, the ClaimDuty. In Figure 4.5 we
have summarised the 4 resulting classes of duties, namely PrivilegeNoclaim,
ClaimDuty, PowerLiability and ImmunityDisability. The classes
are grouped as sub-classes of the abstract class Right.
PrivilegeNoclaim ClaimDuty PowerLiability ImmunityDisability
Right
Figure 4.3: The hierarchy of rights.
Counter-parties The addressee of the legal prescription is the Subject. In our
framework we identify the concept of subject with the concept of Actor. Be-
cause of the concept of correlativeness, both the right holder and its correlative
are actors. If a person has a right, then another person has its complement. This
is shown in Figure 4.5, where the class Actor, representing the subject, and the
class Right are introduced and connected by the two relationships holder
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and counterparty. When a right is created, it connects the two Actors.
Any Actor can be owner of an unlimited number of rights, and a right has
exactly two Actors.
Actor Right
1 0..*
1 0..*
holder
counterparty
Figure 4.4: A right connects two parties: the holder and its counter-party.
Rights are not symmetric: the position of the claim owner is different from
the position of the duty owner. Generally speaking, the two positions are called
active (juridical) position and passive (juridical) position, and each right has
exactly an active position and a passive position. To capture this characteris-
tic in the metamodel, active Actors are in holder relation, while passive
Actors are in counterparty relation with respect to the right, as shown in
Figure 4.5.
Action The last component of a prescription is the concerned action. Here we
use the word action in the sense of (Sartor, 2006) - i.e., a concept that groups
behavioural actions and productive actions (not shown in the meta-model).
To avoid confusion with a more common use of the word, we refer to it as
PrescribedAction. Each Right is in concerns relations with exactly
one PrescribedAction, but an PrescribedAction can be addressed
by a number of rights, as depicted in Figure 4.5.
Dominance The concept of normative proposition allows to split the complexity
of legal statements into their atomic elements. But the legal prescriptions con-
tained in laws have more properties that have to be considered. In particular,
legal prescriptions are articulated structures built with conditions, exceptions,
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Actor
PrivilegeNoclaim ClaimDuty PowerLiability ImmunityDisability
sourceArt
Right
1
0..*
1
0..*
PrescribedAction
0..*
1
holder
counterparty
concerns
before
1
0..*
Goalwants 0..*
1..* realize
Realization
Dominance
1
0..*
0..*
1 realizedBy
10..* after
Subject
Embodiment
1
0..*
0..*
1
Figure 4.5: The meta-model of the No`mos language.
and so on. It is important to capture the effects of these conditionals in order
to obtain a meaningful requirements set. We give a uniform representation of
conditional elements by establishing an order between normative propositions.
Given a set of normative propositions {NP1...NPn}, NPk > NPk+1 - read:
NPk overcomes NPk+1 - means that if NPk is satisfied, then the fulfilment of
NPk+1 is not relevant. For example, a citizen has the duty to give his personal
details to the policemen; but if the policeman does not identify itself correctly as
a policeman, then the citizen whether to do it or not. In this case, we say that the
privilege of giving personal data to a not properly identified person dominates
the duty. This is captured in the metamodel via the definition of the concept of
dominance (class Dominance), connected to the class Right.
4.3.2 Representing Compliance
Embodiment Subject addressed by law are abstract conceptions. In other words,
in real legislation systems can’t be considered as valid propositions such as
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Right
before
1
0..*
Dominance
10..* after
Figure 4.6: Rights are put in dominance relation with each other.
ClaimMary(DoesJohn[Pay 100e]), because, as said before, law can’t explicitly
address a specific agent (here, Mary and John); rather, it has to indicate in an
abstract way the characteristics that let identify the concrete agents.
Actor
Subject
Embodiment
1
0..*
0..*
1
Figure 4.7: Every actor can embody a legal subject, including other legal subjects.
In the No`mos meta-model, this is expressed by introducing two new classes,
as in Figure 4.7. The class Subject is a generalisation of the Actor class.
Semantically, a Subject is a rigid classification as in (Guizzardi et al., 2004):
rigid means that every instance of a type is necessarily (in a modal sense) an
instance of that type — i.e., if the type don’t exist the instance can’t cease to be
an instance. For example, if a law addresses “all Italian citizens”, every Italian
citizen is automatically a subject of such law, unless he changes citizenship.
This is different from the relation between Agent and Role, where the is-a
relation between an agent and a role means that the behaviour of the role is
intentionally assigned to the agent.
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Realisation Rights concern actions, which can be behavioural or productive.
Intuitively, the characterisation of these actions is a description of a behaviour
of the addressee actor and can result in a goal or task of the actor. However,
an action characterisation, per se, is not a goal neither a task, because a goal
needs to be wanted and a task needs to be performed by an actor, and an ac-
tion characterisation misses this. It’s necessary to separate the concept of goal
from the one of action characterisation to avoid misleading shortcuts. How-
ever, we need to be aware when a goal or task fit the characterisation given
by law. In Figure 4.5, this is expressed with the concept of realisation (class
Realization), which puts in relation something that belongs to the law with
something that belongs to the intentions of actors. In the next section, we show
how we use the Realization concept to propose a solution to the problem
of requirements compliance.
Actor
PrescribedAction
Goalwants 0..*
1..*
realize
Realization
1
0..* 0..*
1 realizedBy
Figure 4.8: Actors’ goals can realise prescriptions.
4.4 Visual notation
In order to support the requirements analyst in dealing with legal prescriptions
across the subsequent phases of the requirements elicitation process, normative
propositions are represented in the No`mos frameworks by means of a visual
notation. The notation of the No`mos language, depicted in Figure 4.18, has
been defined as an extension of the i* visual notation. In fact, to argue about in-
tentional compliance of requirements, it is necessary the language supports both
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the representation of the intentional dimension of the domain - i.e., stakeholders
with their goals - and of the legal dimension - i.e., the legal prescriptions.
In summary, the actors linked by a right (holder and counterparty) are mod-
elled as circles (i.e., i* actors). The specified action is represented as a tri-
angle and linked with both the actors. The kind of right (privilege/noclaim,
claim/duty, power/liability, immunity/disability) is distinguished via labels on
both the edges of the right relationships. Optionally, it’s also possible to an-
notate with the same labels on the left side the triangle representing the action.
The language also introduces a dominance relationship between specified ac-
tions, represented as a link between two prescribed actions and labelled with a
“>” symbol that goes from the dominant action to the dominated one. Finally,
a realisation relation is used in the language to establish a relation between one
element of the intentional model and one element of the legal model. In the
following, we will detail the use of the language.
Legal relations Figure 4.9 shows a situation that is generated by laws on private
transportation. There are subjects (the actor [Sender] in the picture) shipping
goods, and subjects (actor [Carrier]) who physically do the transportation and de-
liver the goods. Law says that the action, which is the object of the transporta-
tion activity, i.e. [Goods be delivered], is a right for the sender. Said differently,
the sender can pretend that action to be done by the carrier, and legally obtain
it from a judge, if the carrier does not accomplish it. The carrier is therefore
addressed by the corresponding duty.
Recalling the formalisation in previous section, the diagram in the picture is
equivalent to say that the sender has a claim that the sender deliver goods:
ClaimSender(DoesCarrier[Goods be delivered])
or, equivalently, that there is an obligation for the carrier towards the sender to
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deliver goods:
OblSender(DoesCarrier[Goods be delivered])
CarrierSender Goods
be delivered
Figure 4.9: The claim/duty legal relation.
Figure 4.9 depicts another situation taken from the same law on transporta-
tion. Here, the carrier has a privilege: he can subcontract the execution of the
delivery to somebody else. In this case, the sender can’t do anything to prevent
this to happen: he has a no-claim.
SenderCarrier Subcontract
shipment
Figure 4.10: The privilege/noclaim legal relation.
In Figure 4.11 is depicted the power of the sender to withdraw the mandate.
The nature of the power is apparently similar to the one of the claim, since
in both cases the holder may arbitrarily use the right to produce an effect on
the counter-party. The most visible difference is that in this case, the counter-
party does not have to do anything: the use of the power automatically produces
the effect on the counter-party, who is consequently owner of a liability. Worth
noticing that this automatism is due to the fact that the power does not addresses
a concrete action, but produces only a legal modification on another right.
Figure 4.12 shows an immunity of the carrier against the sender. An immu-
nity is basically a means of self-defense from a power of somebody else. For
this reason, it will always appear in relation of such a right. In the picture, the
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CarrierSender Withdraw
mandate
Figure 4.11: The power/liability legal relation.
carrier has the immunity from the sender’s power to withdraw the mandate, if
the carrier is able to demonstrate the on-time delivery.
Figure 4.13 summarises the result of rights modelling and how rights form
legal relations between actors. However, the immunity case let clearly under-
stand that legal rights rarely can be treated apart of each other. In order to put
in relation legal relations, dominance relations are used.
Dominance Figure 4.14 depicts a dominance relation between rights. The pic-
tures shows that, for the Carrier actor, the privilege to subcontract the ship-
ment dominates the duty to delivery the goods. In other words, the relation
shows graphically the priority between rights. The relation arrow links the two
symbols of PrescribedAction, and this way it establishes the relation be-
tween the relative rights and, ultimately, to the normative propositions. By using
the dominance relation, it is also possible to establish links between rights that
come form normative propositions contained in different laws. This way, the
rights that address a certain actor are abstracted from the structure of the legal
documents. Worth noticing that a simple diagram like this is enough to generate
a legal alternative. In fact, since the dominant right is a privilege, it ends up that
the Carrier has two alternatives: either it delivers goods, or it uses its right and
SenderCarrier Demonstrate
on-time delivery
Figure 4.12: The immunity/disability legal relation.
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Carrier
Sender
Goods
be delivered
Withdraw
mandate
Subcontract
shipment
Demonstrate
on-time delivery
Figure 4.13: In this example, it is shown how legal relations contribute in shaping the social and
organisational settings.
subcontracts the delivery.
Carrier
Goods
be delivered
Subcontract
shipment
>
Figure 4.14: A dominance relation.
Embodiment Figure 4.15 depicts an embodiment relation between an actor of
the domain and a legal subject. The picture shows that the [Carrier Company] is
the subject referred to as [Carrier] in the law. [Carrier Company] is not a concrete
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agent: [T.C. Inc.] is actually the agent that actually plays the role of a carrier
company. Worth saying that, when not strictly necessary, in the following when
an embodiment relation binds an actor of the domain and a legal subject, we
will model only the domain actor, assigning to that actor all the right belonging
to the corresponding legal subject.
Realisation Finally, a realisation between a goal and a right is depicted in Fig-
ure 4.16 as an arrow that links the goal with the right. The picture shows that,
by achieving the goal [Delivery goods] goal, the [Carrier Company] is able to fulfil the
duty [Goods be delivered].
In summary The usage of the language is depicted in Figure 4.17. The diagram
in the picture shows the whole law that regulates the shipment of goods. The di-
agram can be read as follows: the carrier actor has the duty, towards the sender
actor, to deliver the shipped goods. However, the carrier has the privilege to
subcontract the delivery service to others. The carrier is free to decide whether
to subcontract or not. The dominance relation says that, if the carrier subcon-
tracts, then it has not to perform the shipment. Otherwise, if the shipment is not
subcontracted, and the carrier does not perform on its own, then the sender has
Carrier
embodies
Carrier
Company
T.C. Inc.play
Figure 4.15: An embodiment relation.
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Goods
be delivered
Delivery
goods
Carrier
Company Driver
Delivery
Figure 4.16: A realisation relation.
the power to withdraw the mandate to the carrier.
Carrier
Sender
Goods
be delivered
Withdraw
mandate
Subcontract
shipment
Withdraw
mandate
Goods
be delivered
Subcontract
shipment
>
<
Demonstrate
on-time delivery
Demonstrate
on-time delivery
>
Figure 4.17: An example of use of the No`mos modelling language.
Figure 4.18 summarises the notation used by the No`mos language. In the
next chapter, we will detail the semantics of the specific constructs introduced
by the No`mos framework (embodiment, dominance and realisation) and will
describe how to use them to assess compliance.
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embodies
>dominance( A1, A2 ) A1 A2
G Arealization( G, A )
embodies( A1, A2 ) Actor Actor
privilegeNoclaim( k, j, A )
claimDuty( k, j, A )
powerLiability( k, j, A )
immunityDisability( k, j, A )
A
A
A
A
j
j
j
j
k
k
k
k
The Nòmos language
Duty
Claim
Cl
Privilege
Pr
Immunity
Im
Power
Pw
Noclaim
Nc
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Figure 4.18: The primitives for the No`mos visual languages.
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Chapter 5
Compliance analysis
We stated the problem of law compliance of requirements as the condition that,
under some assumptions K, whenever R holds, L holds too. In terms of mod-
els, R can be represented by means of goals, and we introduced the No`mos
modelling language that can be used to represent L by means of normative
propositions. Given a model, comprised by elements of both R and L (i.e.,
goals and normative propositions), we can make explicit the entailment relation
of Equation (3.6) as a property of such model.
5.1 Compliance assessment
As stated in Chapter 3, law is comprised by a collection of propositions defining
states of the world. In Chapter 4, we have provided an ontological analysis of
such propositions, and linked them with conceptual models for requirements. In
this section, we will detail the relation between normative proposition and states
of the world, which in turn is the key to provide a solution for the requirements
compliance problem.
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5.1.1 State-level compliance
According to (van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000), a goal “defines a set of de-
sired behaviors, where a behavior is a temporal sequence of states”. If a system,
which supports a goal g, is in one of the states defined by the goal, then the goal
is satisfied (Giorgini et al., 2002). So we define W (g) the set of states of the
world, in which the goal proposition is true:
WG(g) = W (g)|g = > (5.1)
Applicability As explained in previous chapter, a normative proposition is com-
prised by four elements: the addressee of the normative proposition, who is also
the holder of the right specified in the normative proposition, and the passive
subject in the generated legal relation; its counter-party, or active subject of the
legal relation; the right type; and the specified action:
<np> := { <actor>, <counter-party>,
<rightType>, <action> }
For example, let consider the sentence “Hospitals must keep patients’ per-
sonal data closed”. Out of this sentence, a normative proposition can be instan-
tiated:
np1 = { "Hospital", "Patient", "duty", "Patient’s
data kept closed" }
In other words, Hospitals have the duty, towards their patients, to keep their
personal data closed; or, patients have the claim, towards the Hospital they refer
to, to have their personal data kept closed. Within the boundaries of a legis-
lation - i.e., without taking into consideration the domain, its stakeholders and
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their actual behaviour - this normative proposition is necessarily true: the propo-
sition is actually creating the right by uttering it; so the normative proposition
is tautologically true.
When the domain is taken into consideration, things change. Requirements
express the desires of stakeholders that will be supported the system, whose
behaviour will match their original wishes. According to the requirements de-
signed for that behaviour, it will made possible a set of states rather than another.
In each state defined by such behaviour - designed by means of its requirements
- each of the four components of the normative proposition above can be true or
false. In other words, given a state of the world w,
<action> is true if in the given state the result specified by the action
is produced. In the example, if patient’s data is kept closed the <action>
component is true. If patient’s data is disclosed <action> is false. Given
a normative proposition np, we write a(np) to indicate the truth value of the
<action> element. Therefore, the set of states of the world in which a(np) is
true is the set of applicable states:
WA(np) = W (a(np))|a(np) = > (5.2)
<rightType> is true if in the given state it is true that such right is ap-
plicable to the specified action. As explained more in detail later, in the above
example if the Patient’s data is kept for generic health care purposes the duty
holds — i.e., it is evaluated as true. However, if it is processed for other pur-
poses - for example, security measures - the duty does not hold. Similarly, if
the data is disclosed to another institution, which in turn provides health care
services, the duty does not hold.
<holder> and <counter-party> are true if the one, who is in charge
of fulfilling the right, and the one, who owns the correlative right, are the actors
addressed by the normative proposition.
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If a certain right holds, its holder is the actor under analysis and is held
against the proper counter-party, we write h(np) = >; otherwise, we write
h(np) = ⊥. Said differently, we reduce the truth values of holder and counter-
party to particular applicability criteria. Therefore, the set of states of the world
in which h(np) is true is the set of addressed states:
WH(np) = W (h(np))|h(np) = > (5.3)
Figure 5.1 depicts the possible combination of the set of states defined by g,
a(np) and h(np). The combination of these values define the compliance of a
given state of the world. Table 5.1 reports the truth values for the components of
compliance analysis and for the resulting compliance condition. The first row
of the table refers to the nature of the right type carried by a normative propo-
sition — e.g., claim, duty, privilege, power and so on. Given a set of states of
the world, the “Right” row informs whether the right is applicable or not. The
second row refers to the action carried by the normative proposition. The table
reports true if the proposition describing the action is entailed in the specified
state of the world, and reports false otherwise. The third row refers to the re-
quirement we want to evaluate for compliance. Finally, the fourth row of the
table reports a value that expresses whether a given state (numbered according
to Figure 5.1) is compliant or not.
Table 5.1: Truth values for compliance analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
h(np) (Right) > > > > ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
a(np) (Action) > ⊥ > ⊥ > ⊥ > ⊥
g (Goal) > > ⊥ ⊥ > > ⊥ ⊥
admissible > ⊥ ⊥ > > > > >
In cases #5 to #8, h(np) does not hold. It means that the specified right is
not addressing this state of the world; so is a goal g is describing this state as
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A = a(np)
H = h(np)
G = g
1
5
3 2
7 6
4 8
Figure 5.1: Venn diagram representing the truth table of compliance
wants by the stakeholder, a requirements specification derived by g on this state
is admissible, but if this state is not expressed through a goal it is admissible as
well. Since there is no possibility to be un-compliant in these state (because the
law is not producing effects here) we say these states are compliant.
In case #1, the right is addressing that state, and the world is as well in a state
described by the normative proposition; if a requirement is derived by a goal on
this state (i.e., g holds), in the state of the world #1 compliance exists.
In case #2 the goal g hold, but the normative proposition prescribes some-
thing that in not satisfied in that state; in this case, we are out of the boundaries
of the law and this state is not compliant.
In case #3, the right is applicable, and its specified action holds, but no goal
exist, which will lead to that state of the world. This is not a sufficient condition
to argue compliance, but since it is not possible to exclude un-compliance, we
derive that this case is un-compliant.
In case #4, no goal exists as well, but no action is prescribed, so this case is
admissible and we say it is compliant.
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5.1.2 NP-level compliance
Despite its atomicity, a normative proposition does not univocally identify a
single state of the world — rather, it defines a set of states of the world that
satisfy the proposition. On the other hand, goals represent states of the world
desired by actors. Atomic compliance refers to the condition, in which the states
of the world defined by a requirement (or a set of requirements) are also defined
by a single normative proposition.
If we consider a bunch of world states, more than one case, out of those
represented in Table 5.1, entail one normative proposition and one goal. If
W (g) is the set of states entailing the goal g, and W (np) is the set of states
entailing the normative proposition np (i.e., in which both a(np) and h(np) are
true), three cases can occur, namely: (a) Strong compliance, if W (g) ⊂ W (np);
(b) Partial compliance, if W (g) ∩W (np) 6= W (g); And (c) Non-compliance
W (g) ∩W (np) = ∅.
Strong compliance W (g) ⊂ W (a(np)) - Supposing that R = {g} - i.e., that the
set of requirements is comprised by exactly one goal g, the set of states of the
world entailed by the goal g is a subset of the set of states of the world entailed
by np, as in Figure 5.2. This means that there is no possibility that, having
reached goal g, an actor is not compliant with the normative proposition np. For
example, if np = “Crossable passage”, and g = “Door kept open”, in our world
whenever the door is open the passage is crossable.
If this can be argued, then the goal g is the realisation of the law-specified
action a belonging to np.
g |= np (5.4)
and an actor, who wants g, is compliant with np.
The relation between goals, normative propositions and states of the world
has a crucial role to establish compliance. As mentioned, such entailment re-
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Wh
WA
WG
Figure 5.2: The case of a strong compliance between goal and normative proposition
lation between goals and normative propositions has to be argued. If it can be
argued, then we take the argumentation as one of the domain assumptions K.
From this definition, ti follows easily that, if R = {g} and L = {np}, then
Equation (3.6) (R,K |= L) holds.
Further detailing the requirements set by adding new goals, may change that
equilibrium. Supposing that in our requirements two goals exist, R′ = {g, g1},
then the relation between g and g1 causes W (R′) to change with respect to
W (R). Two classes of relations exist: AND and OR relations.
• AND relations. A relation between two (or more) goals is defined AND
relation if and only if the set of states of the world entailed by the goals is
the intersection of the states of the world entail each goals.
g1g2 ↔ W (g1, g2) = W (g1) ∩W (g2) (5.5)
Notice that with AND relation we aren’t actually referring to any specific
construct of a modelling language (such as i*), but it’s possible to map
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it into a specific construct. For example, as will be explained in the next
chapter, we consider i* Or-decompositions as an AND-relations. Let sup-
pose that for an actor a goal “Eat pasta” is Or-decomposed into “Go to the
restaurant” and “Go home”. The two resulting alternatives will be: (1) Go
to the restaurant AND eat pasta; (2) Go home AND eat pasta. It will never
be the case that the actor will go to the restaurant without eating pasta, or
will eat pasta without going to the restaurant or at home, respectively.
• OR relations. A relation between two (or more) goals is defined OR rela-
tion if and only if the set of states of the world entailed by the goals is the
union of the states of the world entail each goals.
g1♦g2 ↔ W (g1, g2) = W (g1) ∪W (g2) (5.6)
For example, we consider i* contribution as an OR-relations. Let suppose
that for an actor a goal “Go to the restaurant” contributes positively to the
goal “Eat pasta”. This means that three alternatives can occur: (1) the actor
goes to the restaurant and eat pasta; (2) it goes to the restaurant but will not
able to eat pasta; and (3) it will eat pasta without going to the restaurant.
If in R′ a  relation holds between g and g1, then R′ |= R and strong com-
pliance is ensured. For example, in i* it’s common practice (even if not stan-
dardised) that the sub-goals in an AND or OR decomposition are semantically
a logical refinement of the decomposed goal, so that it’s not possible to reach
the sub-goals, or one of them respectively, without reaching their parent.
If in R′ a ♦ relation holds between g and g1, then R′ 2 R. This means that
some of the new requirements may be not aligned with legal prescriptions. We
will show in the following that such other cases are solved by reducing them to
the strong compliance case.
60
CHAPTER 5. COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS 5.1. COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT
WA
WG
Figure 5.3: The case of partial compliance of a goal with respect to a normative proposition
Partial compliance W (g) ∩W (np) 6= W (g) - Some of the states of the world
entailed by the goal g also entail np, whereas some other don’t. Figure 5.3
depicts this case. For sake of simplicity, we consider h(np) to be always true,
so that the set H is not shown. Later on, we will introduce h(np) again. Under
this assumption, we have that W (np) ≡ W (a(np)). This is possible because,
as Table 5.1 shows, every state in which h(np) = ⊥ is admissible (i.e., is not
un-compliant).
In case of partial compliance, it is possible to be compliant by fulfilling g, but
it is also possible that, depending on how the goal is fulfilled, a violation occurs.
For example, if a law states that “patients’ data should not be disclosed”, and the
stakeholder goal is “patients’ data is processed electronically”, we can’t declare
compliance of the goal, because processing patients’ data electronically does
not ensure that data is not disclosed electronically; however, we can’t declare
un-compliance as well, because that goal does not exclude the possibility to
keep data closed.
Again, adding new goals to the requirements set may alter their compliance
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WA
WG
Figure 5.4: The case of mutual exclusion between a goal and a normative proposition
condition. If R′ = {g, g1}, with gg1, and W (g1) ∩W (a(np)) = ∅, then it’s
never the case that R′ |= W (a(np)). We fall in the non-compliance case.
Non-compliance W (g)∩W (np) = ∅ - The set of states of the world entailed by
the goal g does not intersect at all with those intersected by np. Under the above
assumption that h(np) always holds, this means that g holds as well, but a(np)
does not hold. This case is represented in Figure 5.4 and means (as in case #2
of Table 5.1) that we are in an un-compliance state.
Non-applicability A special case happens when the set of states of the world
entailed by the goal g does not intersect at all with those intersected by a(np),
but h(np) does not hold in such states. In this case, as in Table 5.1, the normative
proposition is not applicable, and there is no need to be compliant.
5.1.3 Law-level compliance
Intuitively, if a lawL is comprised by a set of normative propositions {np1, ..., npn},
then in order to be compliant with that law its necessary to be compliant with
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each of its normative propositions. If G is a set of goals {g1, ..., ggn} and
egn
k=1
is an -relation among its elements, we have that:
∀np ∈ L,∃G|wants(j,G),
gnm
k=1
gk |= np (5.7)
This is the general compliance condition for requirements represented as
goals.
Legal alternatives In Figure 5.5, a set of possible states of the world is depicted.
A law L addresses that world, and specifies, by means of two normative propo-
sitions, which properties have to retain the states of the world to be legally ac-
ceptable. The two normative propositions holding in the world are np1 and np2,
with the latter dominating the first. So we have that L = {np1, np2}, np1 > np2.
In the picture are shown the states in which the propositions hold — i.e., the
states in which h(np1) and h(np2), respectively, are true. By construction, we
let np1 hold in w1, w2, w3, w5 and w7, and write {w1, w2, w3, w5, w7} |= np1.
Similarly, {w1, w4, w5, w7} |= np2.
Generally speaking, the applicability of a certain law depends on the sum of
the applicability of its normative propositions.
h(L) =
n⋃
k=1
(h(npk)) (5.8)
If np1 > np2, then for every state of the world w, if np1 does not hold but np2
holds, w also holds. In other words, if a behaviour is not valid according to a
certain normative proposition, but there is a second normative proposition that
derogates the first one and admits the behaviour, then the behaviour is legally
admissible. So if L is comprised by the two normative propositions in domi-
nance relation, the admissible states of the world are those in which either np1
holds, or np2 holds:
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s1
s2
s7
s3
s4
s5
s6
NP1
NP1
NP1
NP1
NP1
NP2
NP2
NP2
NP2
Figure 5.5: States of the world
L = {np1, np2, np2 > np1} → h(L) = h(np1) ∨ h(np2) (5.9)
Conversely, if the normative propositions are disjoint (i.e., no domination
relation exists), failing to comply with one of them immediately causes to be in
a non-compliance state for the whole law. In fact, if a behaviour is not compli-
ant the the normative proposition, there is no other normative proposition that
admits that behaviour. We have that if L is comprised by the two normative
propositions not in dominance relation, the admissible states of the world are
those in which both np1 and np2 hold:
L = {np1, np2} → L = np1 ∧ np2 (5.10)
Dominance relations establish a partial order between normative proposi-
tions such that not every normative proposition has actually to be fulfilled. For
example, a law L = {npa, npb, npc}, with npb > npa. This means that npb domi-
nates npa: as long as npb holds, npa does not, and it is quite common in law. Let
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w1
w2
w7
w3
w4
w5
w6
NP1 = true
NP1 = true
NP1 = true
NP1 = false
NP1 = false
NP2
NP2
NP2
NP2
R
R
R
R
T
T
Figure 5.6: Legal states of the world vs. strategic states of the world
suppose that npa says that it is mandatory to pay taxes, and npb says that it is
possible to use the same amount of money, due for taxes, to make investments.
npb > npa means that, if a company makes an investment, then it does not have
to pay taxes for the same amount. Now, with the given nps and dominance rela-
tions, companies have two alternatives: L1 = {npa, npc}, and L2 = {npb, npc}.
We call these alternative prescriptions legal alternatives.
A set of normative propositions Lα is a legal alternative on a law L if and
only if Lα is a subset of L and Lα |= L — i.e., a compliance solution for Lα is
also a compliance solution for L.
As long as many alternative prescriptions exist, the need arises for selecting
the most appropriate one. The above example of tax payment is simple because
only one normative proposition is different in the two cases, so it could easily
be solved. Generally speaking, legal alternatives can be different for a large
number of normative propositions, which can change, appear or disappear in a
given legal alternative, together with their dominance relationships, so that the
overall topology of the prescription also changes. This causes the risk that the
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space of alternatives grows too much to be tractable, so the ultimate problem is
how to cut it. This problem will be discussed in the next chapter.
Legal alternatives influence the notion of compliance, introducing variability
in the strategic model. We said that an actor is compliant with a law L if it is
compliant with every normative proposition of that law. However, aggregate
law compliance needs more than this. The complexity of law comes from the
fact that single prescriptions are subordinated to applicability conditions, excep-
tions, derogations and so on. In previous chapter we have introduced the notion
of dominance. We use it now to model such kind of conditional elements. If an
npa dominates another npb we write npa > npb (and if npa > npb and npb > npc
then npa > npc). So, for aggregate compliance, the dominance relation means
that, whenever npa is in contrast with npb complying with npa implies that it is
not necessary to comply with npb. For example, let suppose that according to a
certain law John has the duty of paying a tax of a certain amount; but, if he in-
vests the same amount in entrepreneurial activity, he can omit the tax payment.
In this case, complying with the second sentence means no need to pay taxes.
Accordingly, if npa is only partially in contrast with npb, needToComply holds
for both normative propositions.
5.2 Compliance Modellisation
In previous chapter we have introduce the No`mos meta-model in its parts that
concern law modelling and compliance modelling. The semantics of compli-
ance constructs (such as embodiment and realisation) was weakly defined, so
in the following we will define it in terms of the theory introduced in previous
section. Using such compliance constructs, we will be able to define the notion
of compliance for a goal model.
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5.2.1 Intentional compliance
The first requisite for a requirements compliance framework, as stated in Chap-
ter 3 is the intentionality of actors to be compliant. In other words, intentional
compliance consists in making the top-level decisions. In terms of models, hav-
ing represented requirements as a goal model, intentional compliance consists
in identifying the set of goals such that, once achieved, they allow for arguing
compliance with a set of addessed normative propositions.
Applicability Partial compliance is the most common case when trying to achieve
compliance, moving from a situation in which compliance does not exist or has
not taken into consideration. For example, when a new law is created, pro-
cesses that were previously allowed to be discretionally designed, are then af-
fected by legal prescriptions. Rarely existing processes are fully un-compliant
— although this is possible, when the law has the precise intent to prohibit such
existent activities. And it’s uncommon as well that the processes are already
fully compliant. Most likely, new laws address existing processes to force their
modification for adhering to legislator’s objectives.
applicability(np, g) ≡ W (g) ∩W (np) 6= W (g) (5.11)
Realisation As of previous section, a goal g is a realisation of a normative
proposition np if and only if, for every state of the world w, if w entails g
then w entails np.
realization(g, np) ≡ (g |= np) (5.12)
Intentionality Referring to the general compliance condition seen above, com-
pliance in a model consists (in absence of legal alternatives) in being compliant
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with each normative proposition contained in the law. If G is a set of goals
{g1, ..., ggn} and
egn
k=1 is an -relation among its elements, we have that:
compliance(j, L) ≡ ∀np ∈ L, ∃G|wants(j,G),
gnm
k=1
gk |= np (5.13)
As explained above, legal alternatives are subsets of a certain law, which can
be chosen according to the intention of the actor who wants to comply. Being
compliant with a law is equivalent to be compliant with (at least) one legal
alternative within the law:
compliance(j, L) ≡ ∃Lα ∈ L, compliance(j, Lα) (5.14)
5.2.2 Ability
A compliance choice that satisfies the intentional compliance condition de-
scribed above, needs to be operationalised in order to have effect. To do this, we
distinguish compliance goals from purely strategic goals. A compliance goal is
a goal, whose reason-to-be within an actor’s rationale is the need for the actor
to be compliant with one (or more) normative proposition. A compliance goal
is needed when the actor is addressed by the normative proposition, which in
turn affect some of the actor’s goals. In practice, a compliance goal is either
the goals that has been identified as realising a certain normative proposition, or
sub-goal of it. In the first case, we define it as:
complianceGoal(g) ≡ ∃np, realization(g, np)
while in the second case, we define it as:
complianceGoal(g) ≡ ∃gc, complianceGoal(gc), relation(g, gc)
The operationalisation of a compliance goal consists in providing a means
to achieve the goal. In terms of modelling, in consists in finding a task that
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means-end a compliance goal:
operationalCompliance(g) ≡ complianceGoal(g), task(t),meansEnd(t, g)
or, more generally, any compliance goals, whose sub-goals can be operationalised,
can in turn be operationalised:
operationalCompliance(g) ≡ ∀subgoal(gs, g), operationalCompliance(gs)
5.2.3 Auditability
Only the running system is actually compliant or not compliant. And true com-
pliance can only be established ex post by the judge. Formal proof of run-time
compliance can’t be given at requirements time: there are properties of law that
makes that the compliance condition can only be stated ex-post by the judge
- e.g., the subsequent design could be wrong, people could behave differently
from what is assigned to them according to their roles, software programs could
be bugged and also behave differently from what expected, as well as the inten-
tional ambiguity. Auditability refers to the capability to provide formal evidence
(proof) that a certain behaviour has been operated in alignment with a norma-
tive proposition. If a compliance goal is operationalised by means of a certain
task, we say that the task is auditable if uses some resource:
auditable(t) ≡ task(t), resource(r), affects(t, r) (5.15)
The idea behind this is that, whenever a resources is added to an i* models
for requirements engineering, it does not represent an abstract mental concept,
but a concrete artefact that is needed by a task to operate. When the access
to the resource modifies it, the resource becomes a trace back to the task that
operated. In this case, we say that the task affects the resource.
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5.2.4 Traceability
Compliance choices have relevance in two different moments. The first moment
is when the choices are actually made, in order to align requirements with law.
The second moment is subsequent to the requirements elicitation, and it is when
the motivation of the requirements is needed. For example, when the require-
ments are going to change it is necessary to know where did the requirements
come from, if they exist because of a strategic choice or due to a legal necessity.
Also, when law changes, it raises the need for knowing which requirements are
affected. This traceability information is also the first element of provability of
compliance choices.
5.2.5 Model-wise compliance
As stated in Chapter 3, four requisites are necessary to argue the design-time
compliance of requirements, namely: awareness, ability, traceability, auditabil-
ity.
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Compliance Modelling Process
The conceptual tools described in the previous chapters are intended to be used
as part of the software development process, and specifically as part of the pro-
cess that goes form requirements gathering to their specification. The No`mos
framework is integrated in particular with the principles of goal-oriented mod-
elling processes. Laws are iteratively modelled together with requirements, in
an interleaved process, and the specification is derived from the operational-
isation of high-level, law-compliant requirements. Being R the requirements
model built at iteration n−1, and assuming that it is law-compliant, performing
a modelling iteration n means modifying R such that a new set of requirements
R′ is generated. R′ must also be law-compliant, so that, at every iteration, the
condition must hold, the the newly generated set of requirements match both
the previous set R as well as laws L:
R′, K |= R,L (6.1)
This is the process equation for modelling law-compliant requirements. In
the following, we will detail how to ensure this equation to hold through a set
of modelling tasks.
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6.1 Elicitation process
Roughly speaking, software requirements consist in information concerning
what the system should do once developed and deployed. Regardless of how
such information is represented - natural language, diagrams, prototypes and so
on - for sake of simplicity we assume that it can be expressed by means of a set
of propositions, so that R = {r1, ..., rn}. The requirements elicitation process
consists in the sequence of activities needed to form R. The process starts when
R = ∅, and ends when there is no more information to add. During the process,
in the requirements set some properties must hold, such as stakeholders accept-
ability, security, dependability, and so on. If the requirements set does not match
these properties, information can be added, removed, or changed. Information
is added if it can be gathered from the domain, acquired from the stakeholders
or deduced from existing knowledge. When the requirements set satisfies every
property, no new information has to be added, and the process ends. At this
point, the identified requirements, if well engineered, should be law-compliant
by construction (Siena et al., 2009b).
The process is exemplified in Figure 6.1. In the initial state, when R = ∅
and L = ∅. Requirements are not in equilibrium: there is at least one prop-
erty not satisfied: stakeholders acceptability. Stakeholders have needs, but the
requirements don’t capture those needs. The process starts by gathering knowl-
edge from the domain stakeholders, and adding it to the model as a requirement.
Adding a requirement - for example, adding r1 - results in the accomplishment
of an activity, represented in the figure as an arc. Each of the arcs in Figure 6.1
corresponds to performing a requirements engineering activity that goes from
a state of local equilibrium to another state with local equilibrium. Such ac-
tivity can consist in (i) adding or removing a requirement to the requirements
set or to its model; (ii) adding or removing a law fragment to or from the set
of applicable laws; and (iii) adding or removing assumptions. From a different
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R = ∅
R = { r2, r5, r6, r8, r9 }
add r1
add r2
add r3 add r4
add r5
add r6
add r3
add r4
add r5
add r7 add r6
add r2
add r5
add r6
add r8
add r9
add r7
change R
Figure 6.1: The requirements elicitation process
standpoint, we classify activities in four different classes, namely:
• Law discovery activities, which consist in the identification of the laws that
at a certain time concern the actor under analysis.
• Requirements alignment activities, which consist in incrementally model
requirements maintaining some compliance condition.
• Compliance verification activities, which consist in the reconciliation of
an existing set of requirements with a law.
• Vulnerability analysis activities, which consist in identifying and resolving
issues that arise from the need of being compliant.
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The general law-compliant requirements elicitation process Algorithm 6.3 presents
an algorithmic description of how such requirements engineering activities are
linked, and how they can be performed in an interleaved way in order to build
models of law-compliant requirements (Siena et al., 2009a). The algorithm
takes as input two arguments: a set of requirements R and a set of normative
propositions L. Both inputs can be empty in the first iteration, and the same
algorithm can be called iteratively when new requirements are gathered form
the stakeholders for reasons other than law compliance. The process ends when
a full compliance solution is found for the input requirements.
Line #1 Requirements are firstly gathered from stakeholders. This activity
consists in every action that is traditionally performed in requirements en-
gineering to gather knowledge from stakeholders, such as, for example,
interviewing the stakeholders, acquire document and other relevant re-
sources, and so on. The gathered information is then processed and trans-
lated into a goal model.
If the input set of requirementsR is empty, gatherRequirements is equiv-
alent to the initial requirements gathering, but if R is other than ∅, this
means that some information has already been gathered. In this case,
gatherRequirements consists in a subsequent iteration of interviews with
stakeholders to incrementally add information to R.
The returned value, R′, consists in the newly acquired information about
stakeholder requirements.
Line #2-#3 If the requirements gathering activity didn’t produce any new infor-
mation,R′ is empty. In this case, the algorithm immediately ends returning
R. This case is a termination condition.
Line #4 If some new requirement is gathered from stakeholders, the algorithm
will from now on work on the augmented requirements set. This step is
equivalent to modelling R′ into the model of R.
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Algorithm: elicitateCompliantRequirements
Input: R = {r1, ..., rn}, L = {np1, ..., npm}
Output: {r1, ..., rv}
R′ = gatherRequirements(R);1
if R′ = ∅ then2
return R;3
R = R ∪ R′;4
L′ = discorverLaws(R,L);5
if L′ = ∅ then6
return R;7
L = L ∪ L′;8
if checkRequirementsCompliance( R, L ) = true then9
return R;10
repeat11
R′ = generateNextComplianceAlternative(R,L,R′);12
if R′ = ∅ then13
return ∅;14
if checkRequirementsAcceptance( R ∪R′ ) = true then15
R′′ = elicitateCompliantRequirements(R ∪R′, L);16
if R′′ 6= ∅ then17
return R′′;18
end19
until true ;20
Algorithm 1: Overall process for law-compliant requirements elicitation.
Line #5 Now the requirements set has changed, so the applicable laws could
have probably changed too. The discoverLaws function takes as input
the working requirements set R and the already identified laws L. The
function returns L′, a set of normative propositions evaluated as applica-
ble to some of the requirements in R. Worth saying that L′ may contain
normative propositions already present in L.
The behaviour of this function is detailed in Section 6.2.
Lines #6-#7 If no new applicable normative propositions have been identified
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(soL′ is empty) the algorithm terminates. In fact, the gatherRequirements
function has previously added some new requirements, but no laws address
such new requirements, so there is no need to assess compliance on them.
Line #8 As previously for R, the algorithm now works on a new set of nor-
mative propositions, so L contains now the existing ones and the newly
discovered.
Lines #9-#10 We have now a set of requirements and a set of normative propo-
sitions. We still don’t know whether something has to be done to be com-
pliant — it could be possible that the gathered requirements are already
compliant. This happens for example when the new requirements are in 
relation with the old ones (see Chapter 3).
The behaviour of the checkRequirementsCompliance function will be
detailed in Section 6.4.
Line #11 At this point an iteration begins, which has the purpose of finding a
valid compliance solution for R. The iteration continues until a solution is
found, or it has been found that no solution exists.
Line #12 The purpose of the generateNextComplianceAlternative is to re-
fine the requirements setR until a point, in which compliance can be stated
with respect to L. On requirements represented as i* models, the function
adopts a modelling approach that falls back into goal oriented methodolo-
gies, such as the Tropos methodology (Susi et al., 2005). Differently form
such goal-only approaches, the generateNextComplianceAlternative
finds a solution that obeys to the general compliance principles as de-
scribed in Chapter 5. The parameter R′ is used here to highlight that,
at each iteration, a different solution is returned, which is ideally the sub-
sequent after R′.
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Worth saying that this function differs from the gatherRequirements be-
cause the latter consists in the addition of new requirements that come
from stakeholders, whereas the first introduces new requirements as result
of a modelling activity subject to compliance rules. As a consequence,
the latter is necessarily consistent with stakeholder needs but suffers the
risk to be un-compliant; viceversa the first, if found, is necessarily law-
compliant but suffers the risk of being not acceptable by stakeholders, as
will be explained in the following.
The behaviour of the function will be detailed in Section 6.3.
Lines #13-#14 If no further compliance solution is found, it means that it is
not possible to satisfy the given stakeholder needs and at the same time be
law-compliant. So the algorithm exists returning a failure (i.e., an empty
set).
Line #15 If at least one compliance solution is found, the solution must be
checked against stakeholders acceptability. In fact, we know that the so-
lution found is law-compliant, but we still need to know it the modelling
choices made by the analyst still satisfy stakeholders. Notice that this step
only limits to evaluate the acceptability of requirements, without modify
them.
Line #16 After having checked stakeholders’ acceptability if the proposed so-
lution, we have a set of requirements (R∪R′) that has changed from the last
compliance verification (done in step #9). So the elicitateCompliantRe-
quirements function is called again, recursively. The function will return
either an increased set of requirements, law-compliant and stakeholders-
acceptable, or an empty set.
Lines #17-#18 If the function returned a non-empty set, this is in turn returns
and the algorithm ends. If the function returned an empty set, it means
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that this compliance solution can’t be at the same time law-compliant and
stakeholders-acceptable, and another iteration is done, searching for an-
other compliance solution.
As said, gatherRequirements and checkRequirementsAcceptance do not de-
pend on law-compliance theory, and any requirements engineering technique
is valid for carrying out such activities. In the following, we will detail how
the remaining three process fragments work, namely: the discoverLaws, the
checkRequirementsCompliance, and the generateNextComplianceAlternative.
6.2 Law discovery
Compliance is a notion that involves two components: laws and requirements.
Law exists in the domain, regardless of the acquisition of any requirement, so in
principle law models can be the starting point of the modelling process. How-
ever, law is an extremely complex artefact, and providing a model of it as a
whole is useless, as the difficulty in managing it overcomes its utility. Not ev-
ery law has to be taken into consideration for every requirements model. In
many cases, no laws at all have to be considered. Rather, only those laws or law
fragments that are applicable to the given domain are relevant to be modelled.
We called applicability the condition, which causes some (fragments of) laws to
be taken into consideration or not, depending on a context. Applicability comes
from two main factors: the nature of the addressed subject, and the nature of
the addressed behaviour. Specifically, applicability refers to the match of these
two factors with the nature of the stakeholders and of their behaviour. So, the
process of law discovery consists in finding such applicable laws.
When performing requirements elicitation, we interleave i* modelling of do-
main stakeholders and normative modelling. Figure 6.2(a) depicts a typical
scenario that occurs while exploring a regulated domain. Let us suppose that,
during the initial phase of requirements gathering, we have knowledge on the
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Figure 6.2: (a) The applicable laws with respect to the stakeholders they address. (b) The
discovery flow.
existence of [Actor1], while [Actor2], [Actor3] and [Actor4] are hidden. Here hidden
means that the interviewed stakeholder(s) did not explicitly mention them, or if
they did, they did this without highlighting their role. This is a typical problem
of tacit knowledge. Returning to the example, we know that [Actor1] is called to
comply with two laws, Norm1 and Norm3, and so we proceed with the analysis
of such laws (Figure 6.2(b), step 1). The analysis consists in either a human ac-
tivity, consisting in reading law texts and evaluating them; or, it may consist in
automatic, tool-supported parsing of laws. In any case, if a law fragment is con-
sidered relevant on the given domain, a normative proposition is instantiated,
and added to the model.
If the laws address other actors, they are added to the domain model. For
example, the arrow of step 2 indicates that [Actor2] is added. At this point [Actor3]
is still hidden. However, by analysing the source of Norm3 (step 3), we are able
to find Norm2 (step 4), which in turn leads us to [Actor3] (step 5). We store all
this information in a norm diagram such as the one in Figure 6.2(b) for further
analysis of the model. So we have discovered [Actor2] and [Actor3]; but are those
actors actually part of the domain? For sure we only want to model those ac-
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Algorithm: discoveryLaws
Input: R = {r1, ..., rn}, L = {np1, ..., npm}
Output: {np1, ..., npv}
L′ = applicableLaws(R,L);1
A = actorsIn(L′);2
foreach j ∈ A do3
L′ = L′ ∪ discoveryLaws(R,L ∪ L′ );4
end5
Algorithm 2: Law discovery process.
tors that are relevant for the requirements specification. For this purpose, the
analysis of the norms schema allows us to discard those actors that are irrele-
vant for the problem under study. For instance, having discovered Norm1, we
could observe that it lays down prescriptions attaining different topics, not in
our interest. So, [Actor4] will not enter in the description of the domain.
6.3 Generating Compliance through Modelling
In Section 6.1 we have introduced the generateNextComplianceAlternative
function as a means to generate a solution of law-compliant requirements through
modelling. Such function is basically a requirements engineering method that
takes as input a set of requirements R and a set of normative propositions L,
and returns a new set of requirements R′, which is law-compliant.
The process consists in 6 basic steps, namely:
1. The establishment of the proper embodiment relations between domain
actors and legal subjects.
2. The processing of the modelled law in order to identify the possible legal
alternatives.
3. check of applicability condition of normative propositions to existing goals.
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4. identification of top-level compliance goals possibly able to realise the nor-
mative propositions.
5. decomposition of compliance goals until finding a task assignment that
operationalises them.
6. attachment of autidability resources to compliance tasks.
Running Example To describe the modelling tasks that will be performed dur-
ing this process, we will use an example scenario. The input of the process is
the model of law depicted in Figure 7.1. The initial requirements R is given
by a healthcare-centered scenario: a US hospital has its own internal reserva-
tion system, consisting in the employee personnel answering phone calls and
scheduling doctors appointments on an agenda. The hospital wants now to set
up a new information system - to manage the reservations, quickly retrieve the
availability of rooms and devices in the hospitals, and ultimately optimise the
reservation according to the needs of the patients and doctors - and to reduce
expenses the hospital wants to outsource the call center activity to a specialised
company. Since the reservation system is intended to deal also with the patients
PHI, system requirements have to be carefully analysed to be made compliant
with the HIPAA law.
The output of the process for our running example is depicted in Figure 7.2.
In the following, we will detail the modelling process that produces that output,
describing the why and how of each step of the process, and its results.
Step 1. Bind domain stakeholders with subjects addressed by law
Why. In the No`mos meta-model of Figure 4.5, actors represent the binding
element between laws and goals, but during modelling this binding can’t be
automatically deduced. Actors wanting goals are extracted from the domain
analysis, while actors addressed by laws are extracted from legal documents.
The different sources of information, as well as the different scope and interests
81
6.3. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION CHAPTER 6. MODELLING PROCESS
covered, raises the need to know who is actually addressed by which law.
How. The binding is operated by the analyst, possibly comparing how actors
are named in the law, with respect to how they are named in the domain analysis
- or, if law identifies the addressee by recalling the most notable (intentional)
elements of its behaviour, then those elements are compared with the elements
of the stakeholders actors behaviour. As of the No`mos meta-model, the bind-
ing relies on the embodiment relation. When a domain actor is recognised
to be a law subject, an embodiment relation is instantiated, and the correspond-
ing rights are automatically assigned to the actor. Actors that are not part of
the domain, but that interact with other domain actors have to be added to the
requirements model. Otherwise, law subjects can be excluded from the require-
ments model.
Result. The result of this step is a model of rights as in Figure 7.1, in which
actual domain stakeholders replace law subjects.
Running example. The [Hospital] under analysis in our domain is an entity cov-
ered by the law ([CE]). The [Patient] is the actor referred to as the [Individual] in
the law. And the [Call Center] in this scenario is a business associate ([BA]) of the
covered entity. Some actors, such as the [Secretary] and what has been called
the [Authority] were not introduced in the domain characterisation, but have legal
relations with other actors. Finally, some actors, such as the [Doctor] and the [Data
Monitor] are not mentioned in the legal documents taken into consideration.
Step 2. Identify legal alternatives
Why. Dominance relations establish a partial order between NPs such that
not every NP has actually to be fulfilled. For example, a lawL = {npa, npb, npc},
with npb > npa. This means that npb dominates npa: as long as npb holds,
npa does not, and it is quite common in law. Let suppose that npa says that
it is mandatory to pay taxes, and npb says that it is possible to use the same
amount of money, due for taxes, to make investments. npb > npa means that,
if a company makes an investment, then it does not have to pay taxes for the
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same amount. Now, with the given normative propositions and dominance rela-
tions, companies have two alternatives: L1 = {npa, npc}, and L2 = {npb, npc}.
We call these alternative prescriptions legal alternatives. As long as many al-
ternative prescriptions exist, the need arises for selecting the most appropriate
one. The above example of tax payment is simple because only one normative
proposition is different in the two cases, so it could easily be solved. Generally
speaking, legal alternatives can be different for a large number of normative
propositions, which can change, appear or disappear in a given legal alterna-
tive, together with their dominance relationships, so that the overall topology of
the prescription also changes. This causes the risk that the space of alternatives
grows too much to be tractable, so the ultimate problem is how to cut it.
How. To solve this problem, we introduce a decision making function that
determines pre-emptively whether a certain legal alternative is acceptable in
terms of domain assumptions, or if it has to be discarded. The decision making
function is applied by the analyst whenever a legal alternative is detected, to
accept or discard it. We define four basic decision making function (but hybrid
or custom functions can be defined as well):
a) Precaution-oriented decision maker. It wants to avoid every sanction, and
therefore tries to realise every duty. Immunities are also realised to avoid sanc-
tions to occur.
b) Opportunistic decision maker. Every alternative is acceptable - including
those that involve law violation - if it is convenient in a cost-benefit analysis with
respect to the decision maker’s goals. In a well-known example of this function,
a company has decided to distribute its web browser application, regardless of
governmental fines that have been applied, because the cost of changing distri-
bution policy has been evaluated higher than the payment of the fine.
c) Risk prone decision maker. Sanctions are avoided by realising the neces-
sary duties, but ad-hoc assumptions are made that the realised duties are effec-
tive and no immunities are needed. This is mostly the case in small companies
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that do not have enough resources to achieve high levels of compliance.
d) Highly conform decision maker. This is the case in which legal prescrip-
tions are taken into consideration also if not necessary. For example, car mak-
ers may want to adhere to pollution-emission laws that will only be mandatory
years in the future.
Result. The result of this step is a set of normative propositions, subset of
L, together with their dominance relationships, which represent a model of the
legal prescription that the addressed subject actually wants to comply with.
Running example. Dominance relations of Table 7.1 define the possible legal
alternatives. np1 ([Don’t disclose PHI]) is mandatory to avoid the sanction. np5, [No
known violations], is also mandatory; however, law recognises that the CE has no
control over the BA’s behaviour and admits that the CE can be not able to re-
spect this normative proposition. To avoid being sanctioned, in case of violation
the CE can perform some actions, [End the violation] (np6) or [Terminate the contract]
(np7). So ultimately, np6 and np7 are alternative to np5. In Figure 7.2, the hos-
pital adopts a risk-prone strategy. According to the law model, if a BA of the
hospital is violating the law and the hospital is aware of this fact, the hospital
itself becomes not compliant. It is however immune from legal prosecution if it
takes some actions, such as reporting the violation to the secretary (normative
proposition [Report violation]). However, in the diagram the hospital does not de-
velop any mechanism to face this possibility. Rather, it prefers to believe that
the BA will never violate the law (or that the violation will never be known).
Step 3. Select the normative proposition to realise
Why. Another source of variability in law compliance consists in the appli-
cability conditions that often exist in legal texts. For example, an actor may
have a duty but only within a fixed period of time or only when a certain event
occurs. So the problem arises, of which normative proposition has actually to
be realised.
How. The hohfeldian taxonomy adopted by the No`mos framework has a de-
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scriptive nature: it means that normative propositions expressed in terms of the
meta-model of Figure 4.5 does not specify how the world should be; instead, a
normative proposition informs that a legal statement exists in the legislation. A
property of such a descriptive approach is that legal statements, modelled with
normative propositions, exist regardless of whether they are applicable or not.
The applicability of a certain normative proposition could depend on many fac-
tors, both objective and subjective - such as time, happening of certain events,
the decision of a certain actor and so on - and trying to exhaustively capture
all these possibilities is hard and possibly useless for purposes of requirements
elicitation. So, instead of trying to describe applicability in an absolute way
(i.e., specify exactly when a normative proposition is applicable), we describe
it in relative terms: i.e., we describe that if an existing normative proposition is
actually applicable, then another normative proposition is not applicable. More
specifically, we use dominance relation between two normative propositions,
np1 and np2, and write np1 > np2 to say that, whenever np1 holds (is applica-
ble), then np2 does not hold.
Result. This step returns the bottom-most normative proposition that has to
be realised. I.e., if np1 is still not realised, and np2 is already realised, then
np1 > np2 and np1 is returned. If no other normative proposition exists, it
returns nothing.
Running example. np1 says that “the CE may not disclose patient’s PHI”, and
np3 states that “A covered entity is required to disclose patient’s PHI when re-
quired by the Secretary” - in this case, np1 and np3 are somehow contradicting
each other, since np1 imposes the non-disclosure, while np3 imposes a disclo-
sure of the PHI. But the dominance relation between np3 and np1 states that,
whenever both np3 and np1 - i.e., when the [Secretary] has required the disclo-
sure, then the dominant normative proposition prevails on the dominated one.
Step 4. Identify potential realisations of normative propositions
Why. Normative propositions specify to addressed subjects actions to be
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done (behavioural actions, according to the terminology used in (Sartor, 2006)),
or results to be achieved (productive actions). As they are specified in legal
texts, actions recall goals (or tasks, or other intentional concepts); however,
actions and goals differ as (i) goals are wanted by actors, whereas actions are
specified to actors and can be in contrast with their goals; and (ii) goals are local
to a certain actor - i.e., they exist only if the actor has the ability to fulfil them -
while actions are global, referring to a whole class of actors; for example, law
may address health care organisations, regardless whether they are commer-
cial or no-profit, but when compliance is established, the actual nature of the
complying actor gains importance; for the same reason, actions are an abstract
characterisation of a whole set of potential actions as conceived by the legisla-
tor. It becomes so necessary to switch form the point of view of the legislator
to the point to view of the actor.
How. Given a normative proposition np that specifies an action Anp, a goal
g is searched for the addressed actor, such that: (i) it is acceptable by the actor,
with respect to its other goals and preferences; (ii) the actor is known to have,
or expected to have, the ability to fulfil the goal; and (iii) there is at least one
behaviour that the actor can perform to achieve the goal, which makes np ful-
filled. In the ideal case, every behaviour that achieves g also fulfils NP ; we
write in this case g ⊆ np. Otherwise, g is decomposed to further restrict the
range of behaviours, until the above condition is ensured. If it is not possible
to exclude that g * np, then g is considered risky and the “Identify legal risks”
step is performed.
Result. If found, g (also if it is risky) is put in realisation relation with np and
becomes the top compliance goal for np.
Running example. One of the assumptions made for building the diagram of
Figure 7.2 is that the requirements analysis concerns only the treatment of elec-
tronic data. As such, from the point of view of the hospital the non-disclosure
duty (normative proposition [Don’t disclose PHI]) is fulfilled if the PHI is not dis-
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closed electronically. In the diagram, for the hospital a well-designed set of
policies for accessing electronic data (goal [policy-based data access]) is enough to
have the duty realised. This may be true, or may be too simple-minded, or may
need further refinement of the goal. This is part of the modelling activity.
Step 5. Operationalise compliance goals
Why. Identifying the root compliance goals is not enough to generate a com-
pliant set of requirements. Goals are states of affairs desired by stakeholders, but
in order to become operative - i.e., in order to be implementable and executable
by a system - they need to be operationalised. In other words, it is necessary to
find a task assignment such that, once executed, allows the achievement of the
compliance goals.
How. This step follows strictly standard goal-oriented requirements engi-
neering methodologies, such as Tropos. Goals are refined into sub-goals, until
the operational tasks can be identified.
Result. The result of this step is a set of tasks, in means-end relation with
leaf compliance goal.
Running example. In Figure 7.2, the normative proposition [Don’t disclose PHI]
is realised by the goal [Policy-based data access], which in turn is operationalised
by means of the tasks [Assign login to doctors and call center], [Monitor electronic transac-
tions], and [Prevent PHI data printing].
Step 6. Identify proof artefacts
Why. During the requirements analysis we aim at providing evidence of in-
tentional compliance, which is the assignment of responsibilities to actor such
that, if the actor fulfil their goal, then compliance is achieved. Actual com-
pliance will be achieved only by the running system. However, in a stronger
meaning, compliance can be established only ex-post by the judge, and at run-
time this will possible only by providing those documents that will prove the
compliance.
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How. After a compliance goal is identified, it can be refined into sub-goals.
The criterion for deciding the decomposition consists in the capability to iden-
tify a proof resource. If a resource can be identified, then such a resource is
added to the model; otherwise, the goal is decomposed. The refinement pro-
cess ends when a proof resource can be identified for every leaf goal of the
decomposition tree.
Result. The result of this step is a set of resources that, at run-time, will be
able to prove the achievement of certain goals or the execution of certain tasks.
Running example. In Figure 7.2, the task [Assign login to doctors and call center] can
be proved to keep the PHI not disclosed by means of two auditing resources:
the [Users DB] and the [Transactions report].
6.4 Compliance verification
The process equilibrium of Equation (6.1) can be altered for two reasons: be-
cause R changes in a non-compliant way, or because L changes, and makes
compliance-risky also the already-checked requirements. In both cases, re-
quirements are no more compliant, so the need arises to verify their compli-
ance. Compliance verification is a process that takes as input a set of existing
requirements and a set of laws, and establishes whether they are aligned or not.
Legal alternatives As stated in Chapter 5, compliance verification firstly de-
pends on the legal alternative an actor wants to comply with. Legal alterna-
tives are created uniquely by those normative propositions that carry discre-
tional rights — i.e., rights that can be exercised by a free choice of the addressed
actor. Such rights are: privileges, claims, powers and immunities. Duties (ex-
cept for applicability concerns) do not give any choice and must be realised by
the addressee, as well as liabilities, and disabilities and No-claims simply don’t
allow the addressee to do anything. Consequently, given a set of normative
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propositions, and a set of dominance relations between them, for each norma-
tive proposition, whose right type is a privilege, claim, power, immunity, a legal
alternative is added.
Compliance relations After having selected a legal alternative for compliance,
the compliance verification consists in ensuring that every normative proposi-
tion in the legal alternative has at least one realising goal. In Chapter 5, we have
introduce the abstract AND-relations and OR-relations. Such relations can be
mapped to i* relations.
And-decompositions, as well as Or-decompositions into sub-goals, are mapped
to AND-relations. This is because, by deciding that a certain goal is a sub-goal
of another one, the semantics of that specific sub-goal is assumed to define, by
design, a subset of the parent goal. Similarly, means-end relations between a
task and a goal are AND-relations, because we assume that the task is executed
within the boundaries of the goal.
Differently, contributions are OR-relations, because the contributor can be
totally disjoint with respect to the contributed goal. Also, if a goal is achieved
through a dependency from another actor, the dependency introduces an OR-
relation between the depending goal (i.e., the source of the why link) and the
goal that belong to the dependee.
Analysis process The compliance verification process consists in the traversal of
a No`mos model to verify that the compliance conditions introduced in Chapter 5
hold. The process, as depicted in Algorithm 3, takes as input three arguments:
the first is a set of requirements R represented in the No`mos model as goals;
the second is the law L whose compliance has to be checked, and consists in
a set of normative propositions; Finally, the third argument, C is the set of
realisations that bind elements of R to elements of L. The process returns the
first compliance issue found, if any; otherwise, it returns true.
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The process relies on the definition of legal alternative to simplify the analy-
sis. The idea is that, sinceR, L and C come form a No`mos model, by design the
relations in C should contain the compliance information added by the analyst
during the generateNextComplianceSolution. So, assuming that such method
has been used sometime before this check, if requirements are compliant in C
there should be a number of realisation relations suitable to match at least one of
the legal alternatives allowed on L. In step 1, such legal alternative is searched
and assigned to Lchoice. Now, Lchoice does not necessarily contain a legal al-
ternative: it contains the intentional alternative — i.e., the one chosen by the
analyst.
Afterwards, the intentional alternative is compared in step 2 against the set
of valid legal alternatives. If they match, we can say that the chosen alternative
is also legal. Otherwise, if no valid permutation on L is found, the function
returns with an error (step 3).
If a valid legal alternative is found, the compliance verification process is
reduced to check that, for every normative proposition within Lchoice the condi-
tion described in Chapter 5 holds. So in step 4 a cycle simply iterates over each
normative proposition.
The compliance analysis checks in step 5 that a valid operationalisation ex-
ists for the compliance goal. In other words, the function here follows the de-
composition of each goal that realises a normative proposition and verifies that
there are tasks in means-end relation with the leaf compliance goals.
Finally, the algorithm checks in step 6 the existence of the auditability con-
dition. As in the previous step, the algorithm simply checks that, for each com-
pliance task, at least one resource is attached to the task, such that when the task
is executed, the resource is affected.
If the algorithm succeeds, it returns nothing. Otherwise, it returns a report of
the found issues. If the issue consists in matching a legal alternative, no further
processing is made.
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Algorithm:checkRequirementsCompliance
Input: R = {g1, ..., gn}, L = {np1, ..., npm}, C = {→1, ...,→c}
Lchoice = deriveSelectedLegalAlternative;1
if ¬Lchoice ∈ alternativesOf(L) then2
return [violation];3
foreach np ∈ Lchoice do4
check( [np is operationalisable] );5
check( [np is auditable] );6
end7
return true;8
Algorithm 3: A sketch of the algorithm followed by the analyst for arguing about intentional
compliance.
6.5 Process outcome
Figure 6.3 depicts the process described in Algorithm 1. The process is basically
incremental: the modelling activities in generateNextComplianceAlternative
always returns an addition to the input requirements, under the constrains spec-
ified in Chapter 5, so we can say that R′, K |= R,L. The discoverLaws adds
requirements without ensuring compliance, however, they are aligned again by
the checkRequirementsCompliance. Viceversa, the discorverLaws function
changes the set of normative proposition L. So we can say that, as long as that
function returns ∅, the process function of Equation (6.1) holds. This happens
for example when compliance is searched for a specific law, and all the applica-
ble normative propositions are in L from the first iteration. Otherwise, when a
new law comes into the scene, not taken into consideration before, compliance
has to be checked again.
6.5.1 Vulnerability analysis
As last, worth saying that a No`mos model correctly engineered acts as a starting
point for other types of analysis. We want to highlight here two of them, which
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are particularly important.
Identification of security issues To achieve goals that are otherwise not in their
capabilities, or to achieve them in a better way, actors typically delegate to each
other goals and tasks. When an actor delegates a strategic goal, a weakness
arises, which consists in the possibility that the delegatee does not fulfil the
delegated goal. If the delegated goal is intended to realise a legal prescription,
this weakness becomes critical, because it can generate a non-compliance situ-
ation. As such, law is often the source of the security requisites that a certain
requirements model has to meet.
Specifically, three cases exist for delegation:
1. Compliance goals. Goals that are the realisation of a normative proposition,
or belong to the decomposition tree of another goal that in turn is the realisation
of a normative proposition, can be delegated to other actors only under specific
authorisation.
2. Proof resources. We have highlighted how the identification of proof re-
sources is important for compliance purposes. The usage of proof resources by
other actors must then be permitted by the resource owner.
3. Strategic-only goals. Goals that have no impact on the realisation of nor-
mative propositions, can be safely delegated to other actors without need to
authorise it.
The result of this activity is a network of delegations and permissions that
maintain the legal prescriptions across the dependencies chains.
Running example Going back to Figure 7.2, the hospital delegates to the doc-
tors the PHI disclosure to the patients. However, the hospital is the subject
responsible towards the patient to disclose its PHI. This means that a vulnera-
bility exists, because if the doctor does not fulfil its goal then the hospital is not
compliant. For this reason, using the security-enhanced i* primitives offered by
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SecureTropos, in the model we have to reinforce the delegation by specifying
the trust conditions between the hospital and the doctor (refer to (Giorgini et al.,
2005) for a deeper analysis on trust, delegation and permission).
Identification of legal risks At organisational level, risks have a negative impact
on the capability of the organisation to achieve its goals. Using i*, risks can be
treated with risk management techniques that allow to minimise them (Asnar
and Giorgini, 2006). For organisations, law is also a source of a particular type
of risk, or legal risk, which “includes, but is not limited to, exposure to fines,
penalties, or punitive damages resulting from supervisory actions, as well as
private settlements” (bas, 2006). Legal risk comes from the fact that compli-
ance decisions may be wrong, incomplete or inaccurate. In our framework, the
“realisation” relation that establishes the link between a normative proposition
and a goal can’t prevent legal risks to arise: for example, a wrong interpretation
of a law fragment may lead to a bad definition of the compliance goal. Legal
risk can’t be completely eliminated. However, the corresponding risk can be
made explicit for further treatment.
Specifically, when a goal is defined as the realisation of a certain norma-
tive proposition, a search is made in the abilities of the actor, with the purpose
of finding other intentional elements of its behaviour that can generate a risk.
Given a certain risk threshold , if the subjective evaluation of the generated risk
is greater than , then the risky element has to be modelled.
If some of the requirements may interfere with the compliance goals, then
the requirements set is changed accordingly and the new set is returned. If no
risky goals have been identified, the requirements set is not changed.
Running example In Figure 7.2, we have depicted the need for the hospital to
have a hard copy of certain data: it’s the goal [Print data] (assigned to the hospital
for sake of compactness). If doctors achieve this goal to print patients PHI,
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this may prevent the use of a policy-based data access to succeed in the non-
disclosure of PHI. This is represented as a negative contribution between [Print
data] and [Policy-based data access]. To solve this problem, a new goal is added:
[Prevent PHI data printing], which can limit the danger of data printing. (Notice that
here we don’t further investigate how PHI printing prevention can actually be
achieved.)
6.6 Modelling Tool
In the next Chapter, we will present the results of the application of the No`mos
framework to three case studies. Such experiences have been performed with
the support of a tool developed specifically for this purpose. The GUI of the tool
is depicted in Figure 6.4. It presents a right panel for visually editing models,
and a left panel for browsing the model, its elements ant its environment. The
tool has been developed mainly for modelling purposes, but it relies on a meta-
model and can therefore be extended for performing queries and analysis on
the models. Although it has not yet published due to stability concerns, it can
already be freely downloaded from http://brenta.disi.unitn.it/
˜asiena/nomoswiki/.
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Successno
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yes
yes
yes
yes
Figure 6.3: Overall law-compliant requirements elicitation process.
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Figure 6.4: A screenshot of the No`mos modelling tool.
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Application
7.1 Building requirements compliant by construction
H.I.P.A.A. The No`mos framework, has been firstly developed and tested on a
case case study. The case study uses a sandbox scenario to generate require-
ments. The scenario is targeted on a U.S. hospital that wants to set up a new
information system to manage service reservations. the hospital wants the new
information system to be able to quickly retrieve the availability of rooms and
devices in the hospitals, and optimise the reservation according to the needs of
the patients and doctors. Moreover, it wants to increase the accessibility to the
system and to reduce the durations of the processes for both the patients and
the doctors, and for this reason, it is evaluating the impact of Internet. At the
same time, it needs to be strongly compliant with the U.S. Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
HIPAA was enacted in the USA in 1996. HIPAA includes two titles. Ti-
tle 1 protects health insurance coverage for workers and Title 2 enforces the
establishment of national standards, health insurance plans and employees. In
addition, Title 2 addresses the privacy and security of health data. In our work,
we consider Articles §164.502 and §164.314 of HIPAA.
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Law modelling When facing a law, the first step consists in producing a model
of its prescriptions, or at least a model of those prescriptions that are applicable
to the domain. To do this it is necessary to access the legal sources and extract
information from them. Specifically, it is necessary to extract the normative
propositions from the natural language text.
For example, Article §164.502 says that: (a) A CE may not use or disclose
PHI, except as permitted or required by this subpart [...] (1) A covered entity
is permitted to use or disclose PHI [...] (i) To the individual; (2) A CE is re-
quired to disclose PHI: (i) To an individual, when requested [...]; and (ii) When
required by the Secretary.
For convenience, we restate the law by splitting it down into smaller slices;
for example, for §164.502 we have:
1. A CE may not use or disclose PHI, except in the subsequent cases.
2. A CE is permitted to use or disclose PHI to the individual.
3. A CE is required to disclose PHI to the individual.
4. A CE is required to disclose PHI when required by the Secretary.
Similarly, form Article §164.314 we have:
5. A CE may not work if it knows a practice of the business associate (BA) that
constituted a material breach or violation of the BA’s obligation.
6. A CE that knows of this infringement is still compliant is it ends the BA’s
violation.
7. A CE that can’t end the violation is still compliant if it terminates the contract.
8. A CE that can’t terminate the contract is still compliant if it reports the
violation to the Secretary.
9. A BA is required report every security incident to the CE.
Out of these law slices, it is possible to derive the normative propositions
that compose the law fragment. The identified normative propositions are sum-
marised in Table 7.1. The first row of the table contains a reference to the
source text. “Id” is a unique identifier of the normative proposition. “Holder”
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and “counterparty” are the involved actors. “Action characterisation” is the de-
scription of the action specified in the normative proposition. To identify the
normative propositions, prescribing words have been mapped in the right spec-
ifiers; e.g., “is permitted” has been mapped into a privilege, “is required” has
been mapped into a duty, and so on. The name of the subjects are extracted by
either using an explicit mention made by the law (e.g., “a CE is not in com-
pliance if...”); or, when no subject has been clearly detected, by identifying
who carries the interest that the law is furthering. Finally, the priority column
establishes the dominance relationships between normative propositions. For
example, an exception like the one in the first sentence (“A CE may not [...]
except [...]”) has been mapped into a dominance of every other proposition of
§164.502 over NP1. Figure 7.1 depicts a diagram of §164.314 and §164.502.
The diagram is a graphical representation of the normative propositions listed
in Table 7.11.
Compliance analysis The process described in Algorithm 3 requires as input a
model of law and a model of stakeholders goals. For our purposes, the goal
model is built using the classical i* approach (Yu, 1996). Figure 7.2 depicts a
diagram integrating the law model and the stakeholders goals. The diagram has
been built by merging an i* model of the hospital with the model of law. For
building the diagram, we assume that (i) the hospital is the CE of HIPAA; (ii)
the operations of the call center have been outsourced, so that the Call Center
company is now a business associate of the hospital; and (iii) the hospital only
holds data of patients, so Patient is the individual addressed in the law. The
diagram addresses only a part of HIPAA and a part of the possible goal model.
Following the process described in Algorithm 3, we can see in the model that
there are four duties: (1) [Don’t disclose PHI] (from [Patient]), which is fulfilled by
1Notice that in the diagram we added a “Sanction” liability that the CE may suffer if not compliant with other
duties. In general this information may be retrieved from the source or related documents, as in this case
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CE
Individual
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Report
violation
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Figure 7.1: A model of law.
the decision to implement a policy-based data access; (2) the claim of [Patient]
to [Request PHI], delegated to the doctors that interact with the patient; (3) the
duty, towards the [Secretary], to [Disclose PHI], if requested, and this is done by the
administration (due to lack of space we can’t model the complete organisational
structure); (4) the duty, towards the authority, of not working knowing the non-
compliance of a BA; for this purpose, the same law assign to the CE the power
of terminating the contract with the BA, if needed. Since the call center has
been outsourced, the call center company is also responsible for preserving the
patients PHI. Vice versa, doctors working in the hospital have the responsibility
to care patients and need to access their PHI. Therefore, the hospital has a sim-
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ple strategic dependency on the doctors for not disclosing PHI. A [Data monitor]
actor is added to the model, and it is delegated to monitor data usage and to
warn the hospital in case of access violations. There are alternative ways to be
compliant. In Figure 7.2 a piece of the strategy is also depicted. Specifically,
to improve the [Quality of service], the Hospital may want to [Provide feedback to pa-
tient]. There are two ways to do this. In the first alternative, the Hospital may
decide a policy such that each patient is flanked by an employee that support
him - this is represented with the goal [Personal assistant]. In the second alterna-
tive, an account is provided to the patients, to allow them to access their PHI
electronically. In this specific case, the Hospital can omit to comply with NP1 -
i.e., [Don’t disclose PHI]. Both alternatives are law compliant according to the rules
defined in Chapter 5.
Finally, worth noticing that with the combined use of normative propositions
and “realise” relations, it is possible to assign to each normative proposition in-
formation about where does the normative proposition come form in terms of
law’s fragment, thus allowing traceability between goals and law. For exam-
ple, the delegation to doctors to disclose PHI derives form the need to comply
with paragraph §164.314(a)(2)(i), because, as shown in Table 7.1, the duty of
disclosing PHI to the patient (NP9 in the table) has been extracted form that
paragraph.
7.2 Reconciling legal and strategic requirements
The A.M.I.C.O. project Amico2 is an industrial research and development (R&D)
project in the health care domain. Overall, the project lasted 18 months of work,
with around 25 people working on it, including project manager, analysts, soft-
ware architect, programmers and researchers. The Amico project is intended
to define the architecture for an integrated services system, aiming at increas-
2Assistenza Multilivello Integrata e Cura Ovunque
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Figure 7.2: A goal-oriented model of law-compliant requirements.
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ing the possibilities of self-supporting life for elder or disabled people in their
own home. The project is focused on the realisation of an Electronic Patient
Record (EPR) for storing social and health information to be used in health
care. Information is stored and accessed independently by the subjects that op-
erate in the health care system: social workers, doctors, social cooperatives,
relatives. The EPR, accessed via web, allows for a collaboration among the
subjects, for improving health care and having social and health information,
as well as economic and managerial data. Technological devices are applied in
patients’ home and according to the patient’s needs, to both support him and to
monitor his health conditions. Data produced by the devices is integrated with
patients’ health history, and with the human activity of health and social workers
to create a health centre, able to provide fast assistance actions if needed, im-
prove life quality of patients, reduce unneeded hospitalisations, and rationalise
costs.
Bus
Database
LA 1
S2 S3 S4
Database
LA 2
S2 S3 S4
Database
CA 1
S1
Database
Index
S5
Services
Figure 7.3: The demo scenario for the Amico’s system architecture.
Amico has been conceived as a network of interconnected systems, as de-
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picted in Figure 7.3. Nodes of the network are mainly the health care facilities
with their information systems, called Local Authorities (LA). The Local Au-
thorities run their own databases, and provide services such as data search and
retrieval to other members of the network. Another type of node of the net-
work are the so-called Certificate Authorities (CA). Certificate Authorities are
the reference actors for Local Authorities. Certificate Authorities keep a copy
of those data that have been verified and can be trusted. So, the data that the
Local Authorities retrieves form the Certificate Authorities are called “clean”.
On the contrary, data retrieved from other Local Authorities, are not verified
and are called “dirty”. An Index node manages the list of members of the net-
work. Through the Index, a Local or Certificate Authority can know of others
Authorities registered system-wide.
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Figure 7.4: The Nomos modelling language: visual representation of the Italian Personal Data
Protection Code.
In a workpackage of the Amico project, we were called to refine the analysis
of gathered requirements from the point of view of legal compliance. Specif-
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ically, the law under analysis was the Italian Personal Data Protection Code
D.Lgs. n. 196/2003 (depicted in Figure 7.4), limitedly to Part I, Title II (Data
Subject’s Rights) of the law. To the workpackage have participated 8 people: 3
analysts, 1 industry partner, 1 software architect, 2 designers, 1 programmer.
The analysis of the compliance requirements was grounded on the definition
of a demo scenario. The scenario concerns the management of the check-in pro-
cedures. A patient may turn to various healthcare facilities (actors, according to
i*) to use their health cares. On reception, the facility needs to know the history
clinic of the patient, in order to select the most appropriate cure. The clinical
data can be in the local database of the accessed facility; or, it can be distributed
somewhere across the Amico network; or, it can be completely absent. Through
the Amico system, it should be possible to access an integrated EPR, which col-
lects every useful information available for the patient wherever in the network;
alternatively, it should be possible to create the EPR from scratch, and broadcast
it through the network.
With regard to the described scenario, five services are provided by the nodes
of the network. The nodes have been labelled S1 to S5, and are depicted in Fig-
ure 7.3. Services S1, S2 and S3 are provided by the Local Authority. Service
S4 is provided by the Certificate Authority. Service S5 is provided by the In-
dex. The Local authority accesses S1 to S5, regardless whether the services are
provided by itself, or by another node. The Certificate Authority accesses S1
and S5. The services do the following:
• S1: Each local authority provides access to service S1 which is responsi-
ble for accessing the underlying system and provide service such as data
search locally. It is also possible to insert new information or update infor-
mation using this service.
• S2: Each local authority provides access to service S2 which is responsi-
ble for accessing Certificate Authority and provides service of data search
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Figure 7.5: A goal model for the demo scenario of the Amico project.
remotely. It is not possible to update information in this case as it read
only service. Once information is available from the Certificate Authority
it’s possible to update or create new information locally by invoking S1.
• S3: Each local authority provides services for updating other local author-
ities to maintain integrity of data between local systems; i.e. to broadcast
“dirty” information (information still not verified) to all local authorities.
• S4: Each Certificate Authority is responsible for providing certified data
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search — i.e., it provides a read-only access to some verified data.
• S5: This is a service accessible from anywhere and it returns information
of corresponding Certificate Authority.
We modelled the requirements of the demo scenario by means of goals. In
goal models, goals express the why of requirements choices. Goals are decom-
posed into sub-goals and operationalised by means of plans. Plans, in turn, may
need resources to be executed. In the Amico project, we used i* (which No`mos
is based on) to create goal models representing the rationale behind the demo
scenario. Figure 7.5 represents such rationale, limitedly to the [Local Authority]
actor. When a patient ([User]) accesses a health care centre, at the check-in the
EPR of the patient has to be retrieved from the system. In the health care centre
accessed by the patient, the system (a [Local Authority]) executes a query on the
local database, and the [S1] service furnishes such data. If the data is not found
in the local database, the [Local Authority] forwards the request to the [S2] service,
which returns the name of the reference [Certificate Authority]. The Authority is
queried to have certified data. But [Certificate Authority] can also be unable to pro-
vide the requested data. In this case, the local authority contacts another Local
Authority (the actor [Peer Local Authority] in the diagram), which in turn executes
a local search or queries its own reference Certificate Authority. If the searched
data don’t exist in the system, the Local Authority proceeds inserting it, and
marking it as “dirty”. In this case, after the data insertion, the Local Authority
invokes the [S3] service, which broadcasts the data to the whole system. When
the broadcast notification is received, each Local Authority updates its local
database.
Compliance verification and construction We moved from the analysis of the Ital-
ian Privacy Code, which lays down many prescriptions concerning the process-
ing of personal data (in particular, sensitive data) of patients. We modelled the
108
CHAPTER 7. APPLICATION 7.2. RECONCILIATION
relevant fragments of the law through the No`mos language, as in Figure 7.4.
Afterwards, those goals have been identified, which could serve for achieving
compliance with that particular law fragment, and were associated with the cor-
responding normative proposition. If no appropriate goals were identified, a
compliance lack was considered to be found.
For example, the Italian privacy law requires the data owner’s authorisation
for processing personal data. In Figure 7.4, this is depicted by means of the nor-
mative proposition [Confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him exist]),
extracted from article 7.1. The normative proposition is modelled as a claim of
the patient, held towards the Local Authority, which has therefore a correspond-
ing duty. Figure 7.5 shows that in the above described behaviour of the Local
Authority, no answer exists to such a legal prescription. In the diagram, at least
2 points have been identified, in which a specific behaviour of Local Authority
has to be elaborated for legal compliance. The first one concerns the insertion
of the data into the local database, and subsequent broadcast to the system. In
this case, before the broadcast is executed, it is necessary to obtain the patient’s
authorisation (goal [Ask user authorization]), and to add such information in the
broadcast message. The second case concerns the reception of the broadcast
system by a Local Authority. In this case, before updating the local data with
the received one, the Local Authority must verify that in the broadcast message
the authorisation to data processing is declared (task [Verify user authorization]).
This has been done for every normative proposition considered relevant for
the demo scenario. The resulting models (partially depicted in Figure 7.6) con-
tained 10 normative propositions relevant for the described demo scenario. This
approach allowed for assigning to domain’s actors a set of goals, which repre-
sent their responsibility in order to achieve compliance.
Auditability Within the No`mos framework, we distinguish goals with respect
to their role in achieving compliance. We define strategic goals those goals
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Figure 7.6: A No`mos diagram that represents the Amico scenario under legal constraints.
that come from stakeholders and represent needs of the stakeholders. We define
compliance goals those goals that have been developed to cope with legal pre-
scriptions. For example, in Figure 7.6, the goal [Update data locally] is a strategic
goal, because it is only due to the reason-to-be of the owning actor; vicev-
ersa, [Ask user authorization] is a compliance goal, because it is due to the need
of complying with the [Confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him
exist] claim of the user. The identification of compliance goals, and specifically
the identification of missing compliance goals, was actually the objective of our
analysis.
At this point, we had models containing a set of compliance goals. Consider-
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ing the needs of the industrial partner, we asked ourselves how to give strength
to the decisions made for reaching compliance. We considered the system and
the running processes based on the described requirements. Design-time com-
pliance leaves open issues in the actual development of the system. For exam-
ple, mistakes in the architectural design compromise the quality of software; or,
even if the software is well designed, software programs could be bugged and
behave differently from what expected; and in any case, people working with
the software once deployed could behave differently from what is assigned to
them according to their roles, thus creating run-time compliance issues. Intu-
itively, developing and deploying the system (or a prototype of it) in order to
verify compliance issues is not feasible for such a large and distributed system.
So the problem has arisen, of how to provide evidence to the industrial part-
ners, of the correctness of chosen compliance goals. For this reason, we have
exploited the notion of auditability.
Organisations (healthcare as well as others, such as banks), face the problem
of auditing the execution of procedures — i.e., controlling internal log data,
generated during processes execution. The idea is that, if an activity or a whole
process is not executed or is executed incorrectly, this is reflected in the log data,
so that through analysis of the log data, it is possible to monitor the execution
of processes and detect problems. One of the ideas underlying No`mos, is that
log data, upon which audits rely, have to be correctly designed. Thus, designing
for auditability means deciding which log data have to be produced, by which
process, when, and so on. For the information systems supporting the processes,
it’s important to specify requirements of compliance auditability together with
other requirements. Consequently, compliance auditability has to be conceived
during the requirements analysis.
In order to assess auditability we associate data log resources to goals. More
properly, the resources are associated to the plans intended to fulfil compliance
goals. Or, as a shortcut, the plans are omitted and resources are associated
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Figure 7.7: The rationale for an auditable process.
directly to goals. In any case when plans (either explicitly modelled or not)
are executed to achieve a goal, they use the associated resource. The idea,
conceived in the No`mos framework, is that such resources can be the key to
monitor, at run-time, the execution of the processes. When a resource - such as
a database - is used, its state is affected and the state change can be recorded.
Or, even the simple access to a resource can be recorded.
Upon this idea, 2 analysts have undertaken a modelling session. An excerpt
of the results is depicted in Figure 7.7. The ultimate purpose was to revise
existing models, searching for compliance goals. Once found, compliance goals
have been elaborated to be made auditable. For example, the [Local Authority] has
the goal [Ask user authorisation], which has been developed to comply with the duty
to have such authorisation from the user before processing his data, can’t be
proved at run-time. Even if the authorisation is requested, if a legal controversy
arises, the developed models don’t inform on how to prove that this request
has been made. To deal with this situation, we added the [Authorisation record] to
the model, and associated it to the [Ask user authorisation] goal. This way, we are
saying that, whenever the goal is achieved, this is recorded in the authorisation
record, where we store the name of the patient, who gave the authorisation, and
the authorisation itself (if the authorisation has been provided electronically;
otherwise, the ID of the archived copy of it).
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On the other hand, the [Local Authority] receives broadcasted messages when
other local authorities commit dirty data in their databases. In this case, the
goal to [Verify user’s authorization] had been added, to avoid that failures of other lo-
cal authorities in getting the authorisation from the user may lead to compliance
issues. Again, in this case, from the model it’s not possible to specify how the
achievement of this goal can be monitored. For this reason, after having veri-
fied the presence of the authorisation information within the broadcasted mes-
sage, the [Local Authority] stores such information in another log, which informs
on which authorisations have been received and from which peer. Addition-
ally, we enriched the model with a resource dependency form the [Local Authority]
to the service [S3] (of the peer authority), to indicate that the authorisation has
to be provided by that service. In turn, this raises another problem, of where
that information has tom come from. This is not explicit in the model, so it’s
not possible to associate the behaviour of [S3] with its auditability resources.
So finally, we associated the [Insert data] goal to its resources: the [Authorizations
record], where it takes the authorisation information from; and the [Patients data],
where the actual data is stored. This way, patients’ data is associated to the
authorisation to process them.
Results The proposed approach has led to some important results. The Soft-
ware Requirements Specification (SRS) document has been integrated to reflect
the compliance solutions found, and to support the auditability of the compli-
ance solutions.
Table 7.2 reports the most important additions introduced by the No`mos anal-
ysis. In the table, the first column reports the law or law fragment, which the
requirement has been developed for; the second column presents the description
of the requirements, gathered or induced by the law fragment; the third column
indicates whether the requirement is intended to be audited at run-time.
As the first column shows, not all of the articles in the selected law slice
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Table 7.2: An excerpt of the Software Requirements Specification document.
Law article Requirement Audit
Art. 7.1 The Local Authority registers users’ authorisa-
tions
The Local Authority writes the User’s in the
Authorisations base
X
The Local Authority inserts the data into the lo-
cal DB
X
Art. 7.2e The Local Authority verifies the entrance of
new peers
The Local Authority maintains the list of veri-
fied peers
X
S1 gets the list of verified peers from the Local
Authority
Art. 7.3a,
7.3b
The Local Authority writes data modifications
to log
X
Art. 9.4 The Local Authority identifies the patient by
means of identity card
The Local Authority records patients’ ID card
number
X
... ...
Art. 157.1 The Local Authority produces a report with the
collected data to the Garante
X
were addressed. This is due to the demo scenario, which concerned only on
search, addition and update of data: so, law articles not impacting on these
functionalities were not addressed. On the contrary, one article - the 157.1 - has
been taken in consideration, even if not contained in Title II of the law. The
reason has been a cross-referencing from article 8.3, in relation to the role plaid
by the [Garante] actor, a public body in charge of controlling the law application.
The Garante has monitoring responsibilities, and may request from the data
processors to “provide information and produce documents”. Such information
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Table 7.3: An excerpt of the Auditability Requirements document.
Auditability doc-
ument
Reponsible When used
Authorisations
record
Local Authority Request of user’s authorisation
Insertion of dirty data into the local
DB
...
Database log Local Authority Insertion of dirty data
...
Broadcast log S3 Broadcast of dirty data entries
Requests log Local Authority Requests of data modifications are
received from the patient
Changes are made in the local
database
Peers list Local Authority Addition of a new peer to the list of
known peers
and documents are those derived with the use of the No`mos framework, and are
in the following enumerated in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 shows the overall results of the analysis process. It reports the
auditability documents for the identified compliance goals. The table has been
created by collecting from the model all the data logs used as auditing sources.
The first column contains the name of the audit document. The second column
contains the name of the actor, who is in charge of maintaining the document.
The third column contains the cases, in which the document is modified. Ba-
sically, the content of the table has to be attached to the SRS, and specifies
what documents does the system need to produce once developed, to provide
compliance evidence at run-time.
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7.3 Gathering implicit legal knowledge
TRACEBACK TRACEBACK was a EU-funded Integrated Project seeking to
introduce new technologies to improve traceability in European food chains.
Assuring the total traceability of food and feed along the whole chain from pro-
duction to consumption is a cornerstone of EU policy on the quality and safety
of food. This is a complex procedure involving identification, detection and
processing of a vast amount of information. Profit margins of food producers
and processors are already very tight, so they require a tracking mechanism that
is not only reliable and easy to use, but does not entail a major cost burden. With
a concerted effort and input from expert institutions, modern technology could
provide such a system. TRACEBACK is developing innovative solutions based
on micro-devices and innovative service-based architectures to provide innova-
tive new information services to actors from primary food producers to con-
sumers and health authorities. Solutions, which will include new micro-devices
and a service-oriented reference architecture for traceability information sys-
tems (RATIS), are to be trialled on two major product chains — feed/dairy and
tomatoes.
During the initial project activity, a team of 3 analysts, produced i* models
describing actors in the dairy food chain. The models were developed using
information from descriptions of current processes and workflows in the dairy
food chains in Europe, one-on-one interviews with stakeholders who fulfil mod-
elled actor roles in these food chains, i* modelling workshops at project part-
ner sites, and electronic distribution of SD and SR models to stakeholders for
comment and feedback. Overall the process lasted 6 months. Key results are re-
ported in 4 basic i* models — 1 SD and 1 SR model each for the 2 food chains:
dairy and tomato food chain.
The basic i* SD model of actors in the dairy food chain is depicted in Fig-
ure 7.8, and the inset shows part of the model in a readable form. The model
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expresses 79 strategic dependencies between 13 actors from feed suppliers to
transportation and even the media in a dairy food chain. The inset shows de-
pendencies between the Feed supplier and Farm actors. For example, the Farms
depend on the Feed supplier to achieve the softgoal feed contamination detected
early.
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Figure 7.8: The basic i* SD model of actors in the dairy food chain, with an inset showing
dependencies between the feed supplier and farm actors.
The basic i* SR Model for the same dairy food chain actors is depicted in
Figure 7.9. The model specifies 251 different process elements and 257 dif-
ferent associations between these elements. The inset demonstrates part of the
SR model, the feed supplier actor, in a readable form. The feed supplier under-
takes the task supply feed to farms. To do this the feed supplier provides feed
traceability data and uses the resource feed for cows, and seeks to achieve the
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softgoal quality product stocked.
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Figure 7.9: The basic i* SR model of actors in the dairy food chain, with an inset showing the
expanded food supplier actor.
Moving from the i* models, the legal environment has been analysed with
the purpose of both discovering the applicable norms and finding related stake-
holders. Using documentation and information gathered from a one-on-one
stakeholder interview, 7 models were developed.
An excerpt of the No`mos models is depicted in Figure 7.10. The actor Food
Safety Authority has been instituted by the EC178/2002 for monitoring the en-
tire food market, whilst the Rapid Alert System, which is comprised by the
national governments and the EU bodies, is in charge of receiving and dispatch-
ing alerts on food-related events. In Figure 7.10 are also depicted the results of
the norms schema analysis, based on the same EU178/2002. In the following
we discuss the four elements that are pointed out by the dashed arrows labelled
1, 2, 3 and 4:
1. The Rapid Alert System is devoted to the collection and forwarding of
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recalls across Europe, so the Food industry operators depend on it for dis-
patching alerts. At the same time, the Rapid Alert System depends on the
food operators for having detailed traceability information to dispatch.
2. Some goals that had emerged as Food industry operator goals did actually
come from EU laws. Recalling unsafe products or warning customer is not
a free choice of producers, but are needed to comply with the law.
3. To minimise the impact that the recalling policy has on the budget, food
industry operators try to discover potential unsafeties as early as possible
(softgoal unsafe products early detected), so they monitor the quality of the
raw materials and, when possible, the production processes of their sup-
pliers. For example, in the picture we show how operators that work in the
dairy production prescribe to the farmers a sort of non-legislative regula-
tion, the Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), to ensure the achievement
of internal goals.
4. The farmers, in turn, put into action tasks and generate goals to be able to
comply with the GMP.
Whilst undertaking our RESCUE goal modelling process using basic i*, we
were aware of the existence and importance of laws and standards of behaviour
but did not model these explicitly. Instead, we modelled these implicitly through
the goals of the actors — for example, Farms seek to attain the goal sanitary cer-
tification obtained. However, a comparative analysis of the basic i* and No`mos
models for the feed/dairy chain (Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9) revealed that the
identification and subsequent modelling of norms added some useful detail that
was either overlooked or not clearly expressed in the basic i* model. This anal-
ysis is described further below and summarised in Table 7.4. Taking the GMP
norm for Farms as an example, we can see that the norms approach leads to 2
new goals being introduced — GMP minimum standards met and other GMP
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Figure 7.10: A snapshot on the domain, with regard to the regulation EC178/2002.
requirements met. As mentioned before, we touched upon some of the GMP
areas using the basic i* approach such as sanitary certification obtained (goal),
whereas undertaking the task keep sanitary documents catalogued is introduced
in order to meet the high level requirement (goal) of the GMP. From this simple
example we can see that the normative approach can add more precision.
Whilst we believed we had already modelled the strategic elements of the
Farms actor, the introduction of the GMP norm resulted in: 1 new softgoal (10
already in basic), 2 new goals (6 already in basic), 3 tasks (8 already in basic),
and 1 resource (6 already in basic). The resource, softgoal and 3 tasks constitute
important additions to the model, whereas the 2 new goals encompass 5 of
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No`mos Actor Matches to basic
i* model
Additions to basic
i* model
Amendments to
basic i* model
Food industry operator / Primary
dairy producer
3 softgoals, 2 tasks,
1 goal
1 task
Farmer/Farm 3 tasks, 1 softgoal,
1 resource
5 existing goals to
be reconciled with
2 new goals
EC178/2002 / Primary dairy
producer
1 goal 3 sub-goals Must review the
goal boundary be-
tween the primary
dairy producer and
the regulator
Table 7.4: Summary of the comparative analysis undertaken between the feed/dairy basic i* SR
model and its equivalent with addition of laws.
the original 6 goals related to standards, certification, analysis and inspections.
Through further analysis of the GMP these goals could be aligned to the norm
or modified accordingly.
Looking at the Primary Dairy Processor/Food Industry Operator actor bound-
ary, we can see that the GMP norm contributed one additional task — monitor
suppliers — whilst it is apparent that the other elements featured in the norms
model were derived from the original i* model. Under the basic approach, the
goals contained within the GMP boundary should, in theory, feature within the
actor boundary of the norm creator — in this instance the Primary Dairy Pro-
cessor. A review of this actor boundary reveals 7 goals related to standards,
regulations and requirements. However, none of these goals explicitly refers to
the GMP goals of milk production authorisations received, cows identified and
registered or sanitary documents kept catalogued, therefore we could argue for
their inclusion within the basic i* model.
Returning to the 7 goals relating to standards, regulations and requirements
mentioned above, it is interesting to note that the high level goals hygiene stan-
dards met and safety standards met are elaborated upon in the norms model. The
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norm 43/93/CEE provides us with the additional detail of 4 hygiene-related sub-
goals, whilst the EC178/2002 norm details 3 additional safety-related sub-goals.
EC178/2002 also provides us with the softgoal human health be protected that
is touched upon within the Regulator actor boundary in the basic i* model by
the softgoal public health risk reduced. This brings us back a limitation of basic
i* mentioned earlier, the issue of whose actor domain the goal belongs to — is
it the goal of the regulator, the diary processor or both? No`mos provides us with
the opportunity to treat the normative layer of the domain as a separate concern
in domain modelling, hence removing this issue and supporting more effective
analysis.
Another area completely overlooked by the basic i* model was that of col-
lecting and dispatching risk alerts, as addressed by the norm EC178/2002 (food
supervision and controls). The normative model draws our attention to 3 new
actors — Food Safety Authority, Rapid Alert System and Member State —
which provide us with 8 additional goals. It is possible that overlooking these
actors in the basic i* approach may have had consequences further down the
line for the analysis and design of the TRACEBACK socio-technical systems.
As mentioned earlier, we originally applied our standard RESCUE goal mod-
elling process to TRACEBACK and did not explicitly model laws and regula-
tions using basic i*. Therefore, there is clearly an overhead associated with us-
ing the No`mos approach that needs to be analysed with respect to the additional
benefits it provides. We can divide our analysis into four main activities: inter-
action with stakeholders, inspection of documents, analysis of norm scope, and
building the models. Such activities were mostly interleaved, but approximately
we can estimate a 1-day interview with stakeholders; 3 days for deepening the
knowledge on the norms; 7 days for exploring the norms scope and to identify
the relevant ones; and finally 5 days to synthesize them and build the actual
models. So, in total we can estimate that 16 person-days were spent applying
the No`mos approach to TRACEBACK.
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evaluation Evaluating this particular use of the No`mos framework we got some
interesting conclusions. In purely quantitative terms, 3 new actors and 24 new
process elements, including 18 new goals and 1 new softgoal, were expressed
and analysed in models developed for 3 separate pieces of legislature that im-
pacted on two existing actors — the primary dairy producer and farm actors.
The comparative analysis we undertook showed that applying the norma-
tive approach generally added more detail to the standards-related goals already
present in the basic i* model — such added detail included cow registration and
sanitary documentation cataloguing. In essence, we were able to disambiguate
a number of high-level goals and derive more precise properties of the sys-
tem being modelled. Furthermore, explicitly modelling the laws and standards
adds richness to the models that can provide benefits later on in the software
development process. As TRACEBACK is developing a service reference ar-
chitecture that will provide multiple instantiations of traceability information
systems, knowledge of each individual domain including GMP and EU laws
is important. The No`mos can be used as a reference model from which ana-
lysts explore the finer details to discover important system properties and final
specifications.
Another point to note in support of the No`mos approach is its usefulness
and effectiveness where stakeholder access is limited. For example, we did
not have the means to access the farms directly, so we obtained documentation
from the dairy producers about the GMP and used No`mos models to infer, from
scratch, the missing knowledge. In this case the norms approach was a useful
and effective way to better understand the domain and capture more detailed
requirements. Results from applying No`mos to TRACEBACK also provided
qualitative evidence to support our initial assertions. The basic i* goal/actor
metaphor cannot support a sufficiently complete representation and exploration
of normative contexts in complex domains such as food traceability. Several
problems identified and addressed subsequently in the project were a further
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exploration of important goal boundaries between the primary dairy producer
and regulator actors or between the primary dairy producer and the farmers.
Evidence from TRACEBACK indicated that stakeholders often did not venture
knowledge and model feedback beyond the boundaries of the actors represent-
ing them on the i* models, and the modelling of norms helped us to overcome
this limitation of the goal/actor metaphor.
Worth saying that draft basic i* models were already available when the
normative modelling began. Clearly the basic i* models did not explicitly model
the norms. Instead, with hindsight, stakeholders perceptions of norms can be
inferred from the basic models. So for instance, the goal Feed regulation met in
the SR model of the actor Feed Supplier depicted in Figure 7.8 represents the
actor perception of the law EU178/2002.
Considering the efficiency of the approach, we estimated the time in TRACE-
BACK to produce and analyse the normative models against the advantages
reported previously. A crude quantitative analysis of the number of modelled
elements per day revealed a productivity measure of 1.7 elements/day (27 new
model elements divided by 16 person-days). Although this modelling rate is
low we also need to take into account the qualitative benefits of the No`mos ap-
proach. Also, further analysis of the data in Table 7.4 suggests little overlap
between the modelled elements in the two models, with 9 matches to the basic
i* version compared with 27 additions. This result implies that No`mos comple-
ments its basic equivalent giving us benefits that appear cost-effective.
Overall, our subjective opinion is that our application of No`mos to TRACE-
BACK was cost-effective, but further research and a detailed cost benefit anal-
ysis would need to be undertaken to provide a more objective and definitive
answer to this question.
Interestingly, the laws we considered were generally quite clear and readable.
It was apparent that the well-organised structure and unambiguous nature of the
legislature supported the cost-effectiveness of the No`mos approach. In contrast,
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scope analysis resulted in being the most time-expensive activity, due to the
large number of laws, several of them cross-referring each other and mostly out
of scope. Building models of the legal documents is also quite time-consuming,
but less than scope analysis, since norms are expressed in natural language, and
to reduce ambiguity they tend to be extremely analytic. In order to get useful
information from them to represent their intentional characteristics, we need to
synthesize them.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Conclusion
The interconnection of computer into a single, global, easy to access and per-
vasive network - the Internet - has transformed them into parts of complex en-
tities such as software systems, software-intensive systems, or socio-technical
systems. Such systems support processes and business, governments and com-
panies, as well as professional, social and private life. Living in the Internet era
has become dependent on the communication capabilities of computers, and it
is not surprising that a failure in the Internet backbone may be the most dis-
ruptive event for global business. This fact raised the attention of governments
on the need to regulate by law citizens’ electronic interaction. In recent years,
new laws have increasingly been enacted to explicitly regulate sensitive matters,
such as business and health assistance, when performed on networked systems.
Also, previous laws have gained new meaning when referred to an Internet-
based activity.
The social relevance of information systems impacts on the way the informa-
tion system has to be conceived. If misaligned with legal prescriptions, a func-
tionality of the system can violate the rights of users, and ultimately breaches
the law. Nevertheless, it’s trivial mentioning that the system itself is not respon-
sible for the breach, and someone else - the committer? the administrator? the
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analyst? - will pay for it. Preventing this situation to happen is in the hand
of those who are alled to define the system’s functionalities: the requirements
analysts.
Goal-oriented requirements engineering techniques rest on the idea of deriv-
ing the requirements for a software system from the analysis of the goals that
the system-to-be will support once developed and deployed. However, when
the stakeholders are addressed be laws, the system-to-be has to be aligned with
the legal prescriptions too, and goals, per se, don’t provide information about
such alignment. This is the problem of law compliance of goals models.
In Chapter 3 we have envisioned the problem of law compliance of require-
ments as R,K |= L which means that, given a set of requirements represented
as actors goals, R, and a set of domain assumptions K, the requirements are
compliant with a (set of) law L if, for every possible state of the world, if R
holds, thenL holds. Finding a solution to this problem means finding the assign-
ment of actors responsibilities (goals) such that if every actor fulfils its goals,
then law is respected — we called this condition Intentional Compliance.
To produce a usable solution to the problem of law compliance of require-
ments, we adopt a modelling approach, which consists in starting from a model
for legal prescriptions, and then building the model of goals in an incremental
way that maintain the alignment with the prescriptions. The specific problem
that we are trying to address here, is to provide a definition for the notion of
“alignment” in terms of the necessity or possibility for certain strategic element
to exist or not.
The contribution of this thesis is summarised as a set of conceptual tools for
modelling legal prescriptions, a method to analyse the models for compliance,
and a methodology to guide analysts through the modelling and analysis phases.
In Chapter 4 we have proposed a language for modelling legal prescriptions
alongside stakeholders’ requirements. The language is rooted in a taxonomy of
legal concepts taken from the juridical literature. The modelling language rests
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on a meta-model, and it is integrated into an existing goal-oriented modelling
language. It also supports visual modelling, adapted from the requirements
modelling notation.
In Chapter 5 we have illustrated the theoretical framework that allows to
achieve compliance in a model build using the No`mos framework. The con-
ceptual tools represent a means to argue about compliance or not compliance
of a requirements model. Additionally, they are a reference point for building
requirements model that are compliant by construction. Basically, having rep-
resented requirements as graphs, we identify the properties of the graph to be
mapped onto the definition of compliance.
In Chapter 6 we have presented a set of guidelines and a methodology for
iteratively build models of compliant requirements. Overall, the methodology
is comprised by several methods, which support the analyst in respectively dis-
cover the laws applicable to a given domain, check the compliance of an exist-
ing requirements set against a law, and incrementally build requirements models
consistently with the theory previously exposed.
With these three components, it is possible to face those cases in which laws
play a relevant role on the acquisition and engineering of requirements. We
have given the flavour of this in the last chapter, but ultimately practice may
differ from case to case.
8.2 Future Directions
We strongly believe that research results have not to remain isolated. We have
briefly sketched up in the present work how our framework could integrate other
requirements engineering frameworks for security and risk analysis, and be
completed by their functionalities. To have practical relevance, it is important
that the framework is linked with other techniques, and specifically with other
phases of the software development process. Specifically, we expect that natu-
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ral language processing techniques could improve the efficiency of the No`mos
process, cutting the time needed to build law models. We have reported the state
of the art in this area, and will evaluate how to use such results.
More concretely, we have to acknowledge that in our framework there is
a wide margin for human intervention and judgement. Entailment relations,
realisations, and-relations and so on are ultimately the result of human brain,
because no automatic approach has ever demonstrated to be able to replace hu-
mans. It turns out that a strongly complementary research objective has to be
the support of analysts and stakeholders in managing this un-formalisable as-
pect. Specifically, we believe that argumentation-based approaches could help
in filling those still open gaps that in the proposed framework are left to human
will. Questions such as if a certain goal actually entails a normative proposi-
tion can’t be objectively demonstrated, however it is possible to keep track of
the decisional process and its pro/con arguments, so that the motivation of ev-
ery modelling choice is at least documentable. We are currently evaluating the
feasibility of this direction.
Envisioning a broader scope for the proposed framework, but moreover for
the motivating issues that led to its development, we want to point out from
a more critical standpoint the role played by laws in very recent years, which
results even more important than how we described it. We made in the intro-
duction a reference to the impact of the Internet on our society. We believe
that this impact is still underestimated. Information technologies are growing
at an increasing speed. Also, other technologies - bio-, nano-, quantum-, etc. -
are growing quickly, powered by software and interconnected with each other.
Technology is making possible the impossible, which human societies are not
experienced to cope with. Technology and law will be most probably more and
more interleaved in the future, with the first creating new scenarios, and the lat-
ter trying to regulate such scenarios. It turns out that compliance will no longer
be just matter of stakeholders choices, but it will get a fallback from the nature
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itself of the new technologies. This relation, between the properties of a tech-
nology and how they will have to be regulated, will become the real challenge
for future scientists.
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Glossary
Applicability
Relation between a goal and a normative proposition, which says that the
goal, according to how it is achieved, may bring to compliance or un-
compliance with the normative proposition. 63
Claim
Legal right to have something done by somebody else. 29
Disability
Legal lack of ability for accomplishing a certain action. 30
Duty
Legal imposition to somebody to perform a certain action towards some-
body else. 29
Embodiment relation
Relation between an actor of the domain and a legal subject. 63
Hohfeldian taxonomy
Taxonomy of legal relations. Created by W. N. Hohfed. 28
Immunity
Legal ability of a subject to be kept untouched from others’ power. 30
141
Glossary Glossary
Legal subject
Abstract characterisation of an actor. It’s the way laws identify actors in
the domain without explicitly addressing them. 31
Liability
Legal subjection of a subject to somebody else’s power. 30
No-Claim
Lack of legal ability to pretend something from somebody else. 29
Power
Legal ability to produce changes in somebody else’s legal position (set or
rights). 30
Privilege
Legal liberty whether to accomplish an action or not. 29
Realization relation
Relation between a goal and a normative proposition, which says that, for
the owner, achieving the goal allows to be compliant with the normative
proposition. 63
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